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Distributed multi-agent collaboration is an interactive algorithm that enables
agents in a multi-agent system (MAS) to achieve pre-defined collaboration objective
in a distributed manner, such as agreeing upon a common value (commonly referred
as distributed consensus) or optimizing the aggregate cost of the MAS (commonly
referred as distributed optimization).
Agents participating in a typical distributed multi-agent collaboration algo-
rithm can lose privacy of their inputs (containing private information) to a passive
adversary in two ways. The adversary can learn about agents’ inputs either by cor-
rupting some of the agents that are participating in the collaboration algorithm or
by eavesdropping the communication links between the agents during an execution
of the collaboration algorithm. Privacy of the agents’ inputs in the former case is
referred as internal privacy, and privacy of the agents’ inputs in the latter case is
referred as external privacy.
This dissertation proposes a protocol for preserving internal privacy in two
particular distributed collaborations: distributed average consensus and distributed
optimization. It is shown that the proposed protocol can preserve internal privacy
of sufficiently well connected honest agents (agents that are not corrupted by the
adversary) against adversarial agents (agents that are corrupted by the adversary),
without affecting the collaboration objective.
This dissertation also investigates a model-based scheme, as an alternative to
cryptographic encryptions, for external privacy in distributed collaboration algo-
rithms that can be modeled as linear time-invariant networked control systems. It
is demonstrated that the model-based scheme preserves external privacy, without
affecting the collaboration objective, if the system parameters of the networked con-
trol system, that equivalently models the distributed collaboration algorithm, satisfy
certain conditions. Unlike cryptographic encryptions, the model-based scheme does
not rely on secure generation and distribution of keys amongst the agents for guar-
anteeing external privacy.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of this dissertation, Multi-agent system (MAS) refers to a
network of multiple agents, wherein each agent is capable of communicating, pro-
cessing and storing information (or signals). Depending on the type of MAS, an
agent could either be a machine or a human. For example, social network is a MAS
with humans assuming the role of agents. Whereas, internet-of-things is a MAS with
agents being electronic embedded devices. In a typical MAS, the agents collaborate
with each other to fulfill a desired collaboration objective. Collaboration of agents
in a MAS, which is also commonly referred to as multi-agent collaboration, relies on
an interactive algorithm or protocol1 that defines a set of instructions for each and
every agent in order for the MAS to fulfill the desired collaboration objective. For
example, consider formation control of autonomous vehicles (refer Fig. 1.1a). In this
case, a collaboration algorithm prescribes control laws for all the vehicles in order for
them to maintain a desired geometric formation. Consider the economic dispatch
in a power grid (refer Fig. 1.1b). Here, a collaboration algorithm enables power
generation plants and power consumers in minimizing the cost of power generation
while satisfying the power demands.




(a) The objective is to maintain a spatial
geometric formation of vehicles while they
navigate in autonomous manner.
Economic Dispatch 
(b) The objective is to minimize the cost of
energy generation while satisfying the energy
consumption requirements.
Figure 1.1: Examples of collaborations in multi-agent systems.
Multi-agent collaboration can either be centralized or distributed. In central-
ized collaboration (as shown in Fig. 1.2a), one of the agents acts as a leader. All
the other agents communicate the information held by them with the leader, which
then processes the received information in a prescribed manner in order to fulfill
the collaboration objective (eg. cloud-based services). In distributed collaboration
(as shown in Fig. 1.2b), every agent communicates information held by it with its
neighboring agents in the MAS. Then, every agent processes the received information
in a prescribed manner to fulfill the collaboration objective (often requires multiple
rounds of communication). Therefore, unlike centralized collaboration in distributed
collaboration all the agents share the responsibility of collaboration and every agent
is only required to be aware of its local network topology. This dissertation mainly
2








(a) Here, agent 4 acts as the
leader for the entire multi-agent
system. All other agents commu-
nicate with the leader, who in turn
processes the received information








(b) Here, agents share the
responsibility of collaboration.
Each agent communicates with
its neighbors and every agent
processes the received informa-
tion for achieving the desired
collaboration objective.
Figure 1.2: Illustrations on centralized and distributed multi-agent collaboration.
1.1 Distributed Multi-Agent Collaboration
As mentioned above, in distributed multi-agent collaboration the agents com-
municate with (only) their neighbors in the network in order to achieve the desired
collaboration objective. Therefore, in general, distributed collaboration algorithms
are much more scalable than their centralized counterpart and are easier to set up
as adding a new agent in the network only requires it to be linked with any one of
the agents already present. Moreover, a distributed collaboration algorithm imposes
uniform computation and communication costs on the agents, unlike centralized col-
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laboration wherein the leader bears most of the computation and communication
costs. This dissertation focuses only on distributed collaboration algorithms due to
the fact that a centralized collaboration algorithm can always be treated as a dis-
tributed collaboration algorithm with a very particular (star-like) communication
network topology between the agents.
A distributed collaboration algorithm consists of three stages: initial stage,
intermediate stage and final stage (refer Fig. 1.3). In the initial stage, each agent
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (n being the total number of agents) collects or holds information: Ini,
which is referred to as input hereafter. The inputs {Ini} are private and known only
to the respective agents. In the intermediate stage, each agent i communicates with
its neighbors by transmitting messages {mij} (here, index j represents the neighbors
of i) and generates an internal state: Statei, which is referred to as state hereafter.
The states {Statei} and the messages generated during the intermediate stage are
part of the collaboration algorithm and allow agents to achieve the desired collabo-
ration objective. Ultimately, in the final stage the agents achieve respective outputs:
{Outi} that depend entirely upon the inputs {Ini}, and are completely independent
of the internal states {Statei} or messages generated during the intermediate stage2.
Specifically,
Outi = Collabi({Ink})
where Collabi is a function that dictates the output of agent i in the distributed
collaboration owing to the desired collaboration objective. For example, if the inputs



























Figure 1.3: Three stages of a distributed multi-agent collaboration.
belong to a set of numbers and the collaboration objective for each agent is to
compute the sum of all the inputs then Collabi({Ink}k∈{1,..., n}) =
∑
k Ink, ∀i.
The communication network (or network topology) of the agents during the
intermediate stage is mathematically represented by an undirected simple graph G =
{V , E}, where V = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents and E is the set of communication
links between agents. As G is undirected, each element of E is given by an unordered
pair {i, j}, where i and j are the agents at the terminal ends of the link. Ni
represents the set of neighbors of an agent i. (As the graph is simple, therefore
i 6∈ Ni.)
The subsequent section introduces the issue of privacy in distributed collab-
oration along with some discussion on privacy definitions that are essential for un-
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derstanding the content of this dissertation.
1.2 Privacy in Distributed Collaboration
As mentioned above, in distributed collaboration, every agent’s state gets
shared with multiple (neighboring) agents. Due to this distributed sharing of states
the privacy of an agent’s inputs is at risk not only against a passive adversary that
could be listening to the communication links between agents (also known as eaves-
dropper), but also against a passive adversary that corrupts a group of agents [1–3].
An adversary is passive if it does not disrupt the distributed collaboration algorithm,
but uses the information learned during an execution of the distributed collabora-
tion algorithm to infer something about the inputs of the agents participating in the
collaboration. Needless to say, when agents’ inputs hold sensitive information, pri-
vacy in distributed collaboration algorithms becomes even more critical and almost
an indispensable requirement.
For example, consider the case of computing net loss of energy in a distributed
power grid shown in Fig. 1.4. To achieve this objective, the agents (power plants
and consumers) can implement a distributed average consensus3 to compute the net
sum of all agents’ power consumption (or generation) over time to get the net loss
of energy in the power grid. Suppose that the red colored dotted edges are insecure
communication links, that is messages that are exchanged over these links can be
3Distributed average consensus is a special distributed collaboration algorithm that enables





Figure 1.4: An example illustrating the different types of privacy, external and internal privacy,
in distributed multi-agent collaboration.
read by an adversary. Further, suppose that the agents circled in red are corrupted
by the same adversary. In this case, if the agents use a traditional distributed average
consensus algorithm (refer. [4–6]) then the energy consumption (or generation) of
an agent gets revealed to the adversary either if one of the communication links
emerging from the agent is insecure or if any one of the agent’s neighbors is corrupted
by the adversary.
Now, depending upon the means through which an adversary learns infor-
mation about agents’ inputs in a distributed collaboration algorithm, privacy in
distributed multi-agent collaboration can be classified into two types:
1. Internal Privacy : refers to the privacy of agents’ inputs against a passive
adversary that corrupts some of the agents that are participating in the dis-
tributed collaboration.
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2. External Privacy : refers to the privacy of agents’ inputs against a passive
adversary reading messages that are exchanged between agents in the inter-
mediate stage of the distributed collaboration.
Note: In this dissertation, the adversary is always assumed passive. That is,
the adversary does not disrupt the distributed collaboration algorithm, but may use
the information learned (or viewed) by it during an execution of the distributed col-
laboration algorithm to infer something about the inputs of the agents participating
in the collaboration.
The following subsections provide formal descriptions on internal and external
privacy.
1.2.1 Internal Privacy
Internal privacy is concerned with privacy of agents’ inputs against a passive
adversary that corrupts some of the agents participating in the collaboration. The
agents that are corrupted by the passive adversary are also commonly referred as
passively adversarial or semi-honest agents. Formally, a distributed collaboration al-
gorithm preserves internal privacy if the entire view of the adversary — information
learned by the adversary or corrupted agents during an execution of the distributed
collaboration algorithm — does not leak any (or significant) additional information
(in statistical sense) about the remaining honest agents’ inputs apart from what is
already revealed from the outputs of the corrupted agents [7]. The latter is unavoid-
able as the proposed privacy protocol should not be perturbing the outputs of any
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agent. If C ⊂ V denotes the set of corrupted agents and Ec ⊆ E denotes the set of
communication links incident to C, then the entire view of the adversary is given as
view of C = {Ini, Statei, Outi}i∈C + {mij}{i,j}∈Ec
For the purpose of rigorous mathematical analysis of internal privacy, we define
ViewC({Ini}) as the random variable denoting the information learned4 by agents in
C (or the view of C) during an execution of the distributed collaboration algorithm
with agents holding inputs: {Ini}. If the distribution of ViewC({Ini}) is equivalent
to the distribution of ViewC({In′i}) for all inputs {Ini}, {In′i} that satisfy
Ini = In
′
i, ∀i ∈ C
Collabi({Ink}) = Collabi({In′k}), ∀i
then the distributed collaboration algorithm preserves perfect internal privacy of
honest agents H = V \ C against C as an adversary that corrupts agents in C
does not get any information about the inputs of the honest agents, other than
the collaboration outputs and inputs of the agents in C. However, perfect internal
privacy is not always feasible, especially in cases where the domain of the inputs is
unbounded. For such cases we can use other similarity measures, such as relative
entropy or KL-Divergence (ref. [8]), to measure similarities between the distributions
of ViewC({Ini}) for different inputs {Ini} and quantify the strength of internal privacy
of agents in presence of corrupted agents C.
4The proposed privacy protocol introduces randomness in the collaboration algorithm to pre-
















Figure 1.5: In case of internal privacy, the view of an adversary is the collective information
learned by all the agents that are corrupted by the adversary during an execution of the distributed
collaboration algorithm.
For example, consider the example shown in Fig. 1.5. Here, agents 4 and 5 are
adversarial or semi-honest agents, that is C = {4, 5}. As shown, view of C consists
of all the messages agents 4 and 5 exchange with the honest neighbors during the ex-
ecution of the distributed collaboration algorithm: {m15, m51, m24, m42,m34,m43}
and the information held by them: {In4, In5, State4, State5,Out4, Out5}. In this par-
ticular case, a distributed collaboration algorithm preserves perfect internal privacy
of honest agents 1, 2 and 3 if distribution of ViewC({Ini}) is equivalent to the dis-
tribution of ViewC({In′i}) for all ({Ini}, {In′i}) that satisfy the constraints: In4 = In′4,
In5 = In
′
5 and the outputs being the same.
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1.2.2 External Privacy
External privacy is concerned with privacy of all the agents’ inputs against a
passive adversary that is capable of reading messages that are exchanged between
the agents during the intermediate stage of a distributed collaboration algorithm.
Such an adversary is commonly referred to as eavesdropper. Formally, a distributed
collaboration algorithm preserves external privacy of agents’ inputs if the entire
view of the eavesdropper does not leak any (or significant) information about the
honest agents’ inputs. Here, view of the eavesdropper is the information contained
in the messages that are exchanged between the agents during an execution of the
distributed collaboration algorithm, that is
view of an eavesdropper = {mij}{i,j}∈E
Similar to the case of internal privacy, for the purpose of rigorous mathematical
analysis of external privacy, we define View({Ini}) as the random variable denoting
the information learned from the messages by the eavesdropper (or the view of the
eavesdropper) during an execution of the distributed collaboration algorithm with
agents holding inputs: {Ini}. Now, if distribution of View({Ini}) is same for all the
inputs in the entire input domain then the distributed collaboration algorithm pre-
serves external privacy perfectly. However, perfect external privacy is only possible if
the messages that are transmitted by the agents are encrypted using one-time pad as
is shown rigorously by Shannon [9]. It is well known that one-time pad is pragmat-
ically infeasible and therefore, most of the modern cryptographic encryptions rely
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on certain hard problems5 for their security (that is, the privacy of the messages
being encrypted). This dissertation investigates information-theoretic guarantee for
external privacy that holds regardless of the adversary’s computation power. Thus,
in this dissertation an alternate (relaxed) definition of external privacy6 is used,
drawing inspiration from Shannon’s perfect secrecy, which requires distribution of
View({Ini}) to be same for all the inputs {Ini} belonging to a subset (that can be
made to be as large as desirable) of the input domain, instead of the entire input
domain. The size of this subset gives a measure on the strength of external privacy
and should be tunable for the sake of desirable privacy strength.
For example, consider the example shown in Fig. 1.5. The view of an eaves-
dropper consists of all the messages exchanged between the agents during an exe-
cution of the distributed collaboration algorithm. Let {Ini} ∈ Di, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
If,
View({Ini}) = View({In′i})
for all ({Ini}, {In′i}) in D1×· · ·×D5 (entire inputs domain) then the distributed col-
laboration algorithm has perfect external privacy. Alternately, information-theoretic
external privacy can still be guaranteed if there exists a subset SDi ⊂ Di, ∀i such
that
View({Ini}) = View({In′i})
for all ({Ini}, {In′i}) in SD1× · · · × SD5 and the size of SDi could be made as large
5Problems that can not be solved efficiently using any existing computing hardware, such as
the known decisional composite residuosity problem or the RSA problem.

















Figure 1.6: In case of external privacy, the view of an adversary is the collective information
contained in all the messages that are exchanged between the agents during an execution of the
distributed collaboration algorithm.
as desirable for each i.
1.3 Dissertation Contribution
This dissertation proposes and studies a privacy protocol for preserving inter-
nal privacy in two particular distributed collaborations: distributed average consen-
sus and distributed optimization. The proposed privacy protocol guarantee internal
privacy (in the formal sense as described above) if certain conditions on the commu-
nication network are satisfied. The detailed description of the privacy protocol for
13
the case of distributed average consensus and optimization is given in Chapters 2
and 3, respectively.
Further, this dissertation also proposes and studies a model-based scheme for
(information-theoretic) external privacy of agents in certain distributed collabora-
tion algorithms that can be modeled as linear time-invariant (LTI) networked control
systems (NCS). The proposed model-based scheme guarantees external privacy (in
the formal sense as described above) if certain conditions on the parameters are
satisfied. The details of the proposed model-based scheme is given in Chapter 4.
It should be noted that the privacy schemes or protocols proposed in this dis-
sertation do not affect the accuracy of distributed collaboration algorithms and add
minimal overhead communication and computation costs on the agents. Detailed
comparison of the proposed privacy protocols with existing methods is presented in
the following subsections.
1.3.1 Internal Privacy in Distributed Average Consensus
Distributed average consensus is a distributed collaboration between agents
in a MAS wherein the inputs of the agents belong to a set of numbers and the








Apart from the obvious application of computing the average or sum of the
inputs, other interesting known applications of distributed average consensus include
14
cooperative control of dynamic systems [10, 11], sensor fusion for distributed state
estimation [12], solving economic dispatch problems in power grids [13], distributed
support vector machine [14] and anonymous voting in social networks.
Result: The proposed privacy protocol can guarantee perfect internal privacy
of honest agents’ inputs (with input domain of finite size) as long as the adversarial
(semi-honest) agents do not constitute a vertex cut7 of the communication network.
Comparison with Existing Solutions: While internal privacy in distributed
average consensus can often be achieved by relying on generic completeness theo-
rems for (information-theoretic) secure multi-party computation (MPC) [7, 15, 16],
those results assume a complete network topology with a dedicated communication
channel between each pair of agents. In contrast, this dissertation deals with dis-
tributed average consensus algorithms that can be used regardless of the network
topology. Garay et al. [17] studied secure computation in incomplete networks,
and showed that arbitrary functions (including the average) can be computed with
information-theoretic privacy against t colluding semi-honest agents so long as the
communication network has (t+1)-connectivity8. However, their work relies on pro-
tocols for secure message transmission [18] that emulate pairwise channels between
every pair of agents over an incomplete network. In addition to incurring a sig-
nificant cost in terms of round and message-complexity, relying on secure message
transmission also requires the agents to have complete knowledge of the network
topology. The protocol proposed in this dissertation adds minimal cost to existing
7Refer Section 1.4 for the definition of vertex cut.
8Refer Section 1.4 for the definition of network connectivity.
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distributed average consensus protocols, and requires agents to be aware of only
their neighboring agents in the MAS. It is nevertheless interesting to observe that
the privacy protocol proposed in this dissertation also requires the network to have
(t + 1)-connectivity in order to guarantee internal privacy of honest agents against
at most t arbitrary adversarial agents.
There have been several proposals [2,19] for achieving differential privacy(DP)
in distributed average consensus by having agents add local noise to internal states
computed during the intermediate stage of a specific distributed average consensus
algorithm. This added noise induces a loss in accuracy [19,20]; that is, the agents are
only able to compute an approximation to the true average (rather than the exact
average), where there is an inherent trade-off between privacy and the achievable
accuracy. The privacy protocol proposed in this dissertation allows the agents to
compute the average of their inputs accurately.
Other works have aimed at ensuring privacy in distributed average consensus
without sacrificing accuracy [21, 22, 24–26]. The protocol proposed in [22] can not
preserve internal privacy of an honest agent if any one of its neighbor is adversarial.
The protocols in [21, 25] can preserve internal privacy of an honest agent only if
that agent has an honest neighbor which is not a neighbor of an adversarial agent.
The privacy protocol proposed in this dissertation can preserve internal privacy of a
group of honest agents if that group of agents is not cut9 by the adversarial agents
in the communication network. Therefore, an honest agent loses its privacy only if
all its neighbors are adversarial, otherwise the proposed privacy protocol is able to
9Defined in Section 1.4.
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protect its privacy up to a certain extent, as described formally in Section 2.4 of
Chapter 2. Unlike the protocols in [21, 25], the proposed privacy protocol requires
the agents to mask their inputs, with correlated random values shared with their
neighbors, only once before executing a distributed average consensus protocol. Fur-
ther, the privacy analysis in this dissertation provides a sufficient condition (t + 1
network connectivity) for designing the communication network topology wherein
internal privacy of all the honest agents can be preserved against at most t arbitrary
adversarial agents.
Note that while protocols based on homomorphic encryption [24,26] can achieve
the strong guarantees for internal privacy, they are computationally less efficient
than the proposed approach since they rely on complex public-key encryption tech-
niques. Homomorphic encryption based privacy protocols rely on intractability
(hardness) of certain decision problems for guaranteeing privacy assuming bounded
computation power of the adversary. However, this dissertation investigates information-
theoretic (refer. [7]) guarantee for internal privacy which holds regardless of the
computation power of the adversary.
It should be noted that some of the above privacy protocols [2, 21, 24, 25]
consider synchronicity between agents, whereas the proposed protocol in this disser-
tation does not require synchronicity between agents. Synchronicity between agents
in a distributed collaboration algorithm requires additional effort and is not easy to
achieve. Also, note that all of these existing solutions only consider either integral
inputs or real-valued inputs, and it should be noted that the input domain plays
a critical role in the resultant privacy guarantees of any privacy protocol. For in-
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stance, secure multiparty computation and homomorphic-encryption based privacy
schemes [17,24,26] are only suitable for integral inputs, whereas differential privacy
schemes [2,19,25] are only suitable for real-valued inputs (trade-off worsens for the
case of quantized or integral inputs [23]). Whereas, the proposed privacy proto-
col in this dissertation can guarantee internal privacy in case of both integral and
real-valued agents’ inputs.
The proposed privacy protocol is very closely related to the protocol proposed
by Emmanuel et al. [27]. However, authors in [27] assume that the communication
network topology is complete10 and only deal with integral inputs. This dissertation
considers a more general network topology and also handles the case of real-valued
inputs.
Topology Accuracy Comm. Cost Synchronous Inputs
Proposed Not Complete Preserved No Reals & Integers
MPC Not Complete Preserved No Integers
DP Not Complete Not preserved Yes Reals








Figure 1.7: Comparison of the proposed protocol with the existing protocols for internal privacy
in distributed average consensus.
The comparison of the proposed privacy protocol for internal privacy in dis-
tributed average consensus with existing privacy protocols is summarized by the
10A communication network topology is complete if there exists a direct communication link
between every pair of agents.
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chart in Fig. 1.7. In the chart above, CST stands for control system theoretic
and collectively represents the exiting solutions (ref. [21, 25]) that rely on the no-
tion of unobservability in control system theory for preserving internal privacy by
re-designing a particular distributed average consensus protocol that is mathemati-
cally equivalent to a linear time-invariant control system. The communication cost
is given for a single agent i using the standard ‘big-theta’ notation Θ(·), where | · |
denotes the cardinality of a set, Ni denotes the set of neighbors of agent i, t is the
assumed upper-bound on the total number of corrupted agents and n is the total
number of agents in the MAS or network participating in distributed collaboration
(distributed average consensus in this case). Note that a distributed collaboration
protocol is synchronous if it requires all the agents to operate in a synchronous
manner.
1.3.2 Internal Privacy in Distributed Optimization
Distributed optimization is a distributed collaboration of agents in a MAS
wherein the agents’ inputs belong to a class of real-valued multi-variate functions
and the collaboration objective for each agent is to compute the minima of the
aggregate of all the agents’ costs [28–30]. Specifically, Ini : Rm → R,∀i and




Some of the interesting known applications of distributed optimization include
distributed statistical learning [31, 32], distributed state estimation [33] and forma-
tion control of autonomous vehicles [34].
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Result: The proposed privacy protocol can guarantee internal privacy of the
affine parts of honest agents’ costs as long as the adversarial (semi-honest) agents
do not constitute a vertex cut11 of the communication network.
Comparison with Existing Solutions: Existing methods for preserving
privacy in distributed optimization that are based on secure multiparty computa-
tion protocols [35–37] require the communication network to be complete. Oth-
erwise, these methods rely on secure message transmission(cf. Dolev, et al. [18])
between agents to emulate a complete network on an incomplete network [17] and
require every agent to have prior knowledge of the paths to other agents (for setting
up a communication channel between every pair of agents) in the network. The
privacy protocol proposed in this dissertation holds regardless of the communica-
tion network topology. Moreover, the secure multiparty computation protocols are
computationally quite expensive in comparison to the proposed privacy protocol.
Homomorphic encryption based privacy protocols [38, 39] for distributed op-
timization rely on public-key techniques and are computationally costlier than the
proposed privacy protocol. Homomorphic encryption based privacy protocols rely
on intractability (hardness) of certain decision problems for guaranteeing privacy
assuming bounded computation power of the adversary. However, this dissertation
investigates information-theoretic (refer. [7]) guarantee for internal privacy which
holds regardless of the computation power of the adversary.
Techniques based on algebraic transformations (AT) have been proposed re-
cently for internal privacy in multi-agent optimization [39–41]. Most of these works
11Refer Section 1.4 for the definition of vertex cut.
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are concerned about privacy in linear programming, however there do exist some
work for privacy in a more general convex optimization problems [41]. For now, the
results in [41] are only given for the centralized case wherein all the agents share
their internal states with a central server.
Recently, there have been several proposals for differentially private distributed
optimization algorithms [42, 43]. However, differential privacy is impossible to
achieve without sacrificing the accuracy of distributed optimization [42]. That is,
the agents only reach the approximate minima. The proposed privacy protocol in
this dissertation does not affect the accuracy of the optimization problem.
To overcome the inaccuracies in the aforementioned differentially private so-
lutions, Lou et al., [44] proposes a heterogeneous step-size consensus-based sub-
gradient algorithm to preserve the privacy of the agents’ costs while guaranteeing
convergence to the minima. However, [44] has shown convergence of their algorithm
only if the individual agents’ costs are convex. The proposed privacy protocol in
this dissertation does not require individual costs to be convex for its correctness as
it relies on a privacy mechanism that masks individual agents’ costs (which anyway
preserves convexity) before the agents execute any existing distributed optimization
protocol, including protocols that do not require agents’ costs to be convex for their
convergence (refer [45]).
In a closely related work, Gade and Vaidya [46] have proposed a similar privacy
approach wherein each agent adds correlated random functions to their original costs
and use the obtained effective costs for solving the original optimization problem.
The addition of correlated random functions preserves the global aggregate cost
21
and the privacy of honest agents’ costs is shown against passively adversarial agents
that do not constitute a vertex cut of the communication network. The privacy
in [46] is proven using the argument of compatibility of all possible costs that can
be held by honest agents’ in view of the adversarial agents. However, the privacy
analysis in [46] does not recognize that distribution and structure of the random
functions that are being added to the original costs are part of the adversary’s
information, as adversarial agents are also following the same prescribed protocol.
In this dissertation, the structure and distribution of the random functions that are
being added to the original costs are properly defined and assumed known to the
adversary. Then, privacy is formally analyzed by measuring indistinguishability of
possible honest agents’ costs, in view of the adversarial agents, using relative entropy
or KL-Divergence12. The quantitative measure of privacy (or loss of privacy) given
in this dissertation provides an insight on the dependence of internal privacy on the
vertex expansion (ref. [65, 66]) of the communication network topology.
The comparison of the proposed privacy protocol for internal privacy in dis-
tributed optimization with the existing privacy protocols is summarized by the chart
in Fig. 1.8. In the chart above, the communication cost is for each agent i using the
standard ‘big-theta’ notation Θ(·), where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set, Ni
denotes the set of neighbors of agent i, t is the assumed upper-bound on the total
number of corrupted agents, m is the dimension of the arguments of the agents’ costs
and n is the total number of agents participating in distributed collaboration (dis-
tributed optimization in this case). Note that a distributed collaboration protocol
12Refer [47–49] for further details on the efficacy of KL-Divergence in privacy analysis.
22
Topology Accuracy Comm. Cost Synchronous
Proposed Not Complete Preserved No
MPC Not Complete Preserved No
DP Not Complete Not preserved Yes
AT Centralized - - -
Gade and
Vadiya, 2016 Not complete Preserved No
Θ(m|N i |)
Remark
Privacy of only a!ne 
parts
Privacy of entire cost 
function
Can be made 
asynchronous
Only for Linear 
Programming
Privacy is not quantified
Θ(m|N i |)
Θ(m|N i |)
Lou, et al., 
2017 Not complete Preserved No
Privacy is not quantified 
& requires convexity  Θ(m|N i |)
Θ(t ⋅mn)
Figure 1.8: Comparison of the proposed protocol with the existing protocols for internal privacy
in distributed optimization.
is synchronous if it requires all the agents to operate in a synchronous manner.
1.3.3 Model-Based Scheme For External Privacy
Certain distributed collaboration algorithms can be modeled as linear time-
invariant (LTI) networked control systems (NCS), such as the cooperative control of
autonomous vehicles [11,50], output synchronization of passive systems [51], super-
visory control and data acquisition (SCADA) for smart homes or power grids [52,53]
and higher-order consensus [54, 55]. For such distributed collaboration algorithms
this dissertation presents a model-based scheme for external privacy of agents’ in-
puts.
Result: The proposed model-based scheme can guarantee external privacy of
agents’ inputs if the system parameters of the NCS equivalent to the distributed
collaboration algorithm are related in a specific manner.
Comparison with Existing Solutions: An obvious solution for securing
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the communication links is cryptographic encryption. The agents can simply en-
crypt their states before sharing them over network during the intermediate stage
and guarantee some form of external privacy. However, standard cryptographic
encryption schemes require generation and distribution of secret keys amongst the
agents. Consequentially, cryptographic encryption schemes require sophisticated key
management protocols for the purpose of generating and distributing keys securely
amongst the agents [56] in order to guarantee privacy of the encrypted messages
against eavesdroppers. These key management protocols add significant overhead
communication and computation costs on the agents apart from the costs of encryp-
tion and decryption. The proposed model-based scheme proposes making of states
in a way that preserves the accuracy of the distributed collaboration algorithm.
Thus, it does not rely on secret keys for guaranteeing external privacy and saves the
cost of key management protocols.
Further, it has been identified by the NIST13 that in case of real-time dis-
tributed collaboration of dynamic systems, such as formation control of vehicles or
synchronization of dynamic systems, the communication delays introduced by stan-
dard cryptographic encryption schemes threaten the stability of the collaboration
algorithm [57]. The proposed model-based scheme adds minimal communication de-
lays and in fact, provides a gateway to avoid any additional communication delays
altogether by appropriately re-designing the collaboration algorithm.
Differentially private mechanisms, wherein agents’ obfuscate their states in
a distributed collaboration algorithm with noise before sharing them with other
13National Institute of Standards and Technology
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agents, have been recently investigated as an alternative to cryptographic encryp-
tions for external privacy [2, 58]. Quite understandably, these obfuscations lead
to inaccuracies in the final result of the distributed collaboration algorithm. As a
result, differentially private mechanisms suffer from trade-off between privacy and
accuracy [58, 59]. The model-based privacy scheme proposed in this dissertation
preserves the accuracy of the distributed collaboration algorithm and is capable of
achieving a desirable degree of privacy without any tradeoffs. However, for now
the proposed model-based scheme can only guarantee external privacy for a specific
class of distributed collaboration algorithms.
The proposed model-based scheme can guarantee external privacy only for
those distributed collaboration algorithms that can be modeled as LTI networked
control systems, and whose system parameters meet certain requirements. This is
an obvious limitation of the proposed model-based privacy scheme when comparing
with existing cryptographic encryptions and differentially private mechanisms. For
now the effect of asynchronicity between agents has not been considered explicitly
for the model-based scheme.
The comparison of the proposed model-based scheme with existing solutions
for external privacy in distributed collaboration algorithms is summarized by the


























Figure 1.9: Comparison of the proposed model-based scheme with the existing solutions for
external privacy in distributed collaboration algorithms.
1.4 Notation and Preliminaries
N, Z≥0, R>0, Rn and Rn×m represent the set of natural numbers, non-negative
integers, positive real numbers, n-dimensional real-valued vectors and n × m di-
mensional real-valued matrices, respectively. Let Zq denote the set of integers
{0, . . . , q − 1}. If x ∈ Rn(or Znq ) then all the elements of x take value in R(or
Zq). For a positive integer q, [q] = {1, . . . , q}.
For any matrix M ∈ Rm×n, its nullspace is represented by N (M) ⊂ Rn. The
inverse and generalized inverse of any square matrix M(real-valued elements) are
denoted as M−1 and M †, respectively; pseudo-determinant14 of by det∗(M). (·)T
denotes the transpose. Notation Diag(x) represents a diagonal matrix with elements
of vector x as the diagonal entries. 0n represents an n× n matrix with all elements
equal to 0.
Let x1 ∈ Rn and x2 ∈ Rn, then [x1, x2] represents the set of all vectors in Rn
that lie on the line segment joining x1 and x2. A vector x ∈ Rn is said to have all
14Pseudo-determinant of a square real-valued matrix is equal to the product of its non-zero
eigenvalues.
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non-zero elements if x[i] 6= 0,∀i ∈ [n]. Notation frac(x) denotes the element-wise
fractional part15 of a real-valued vector x. 1n(0n) represents a vector of dimension
n with all elements equal to 1(0).
For a finite set S, |S| denotes its cardinality; for an integer or real number x,
|x| denotes its absolute value.
For a continuous random vector X in X ⊂ Rn, its probability density at any
point x is denoted by fX(x) and Pr(X ∈ Γ) denotes the probability of X taking
value in a compact set Γ ⊂ X . fX∈Γ(x) is the conditional probability density of X,




Pr(X∈Γ) ∀x ∈ Γ
0 otherwise
For two random vectors X and Y , the conditional probability density of X at x given
Y is denoted by fX|Y (x|y). Let E(X) the mean of random vector X, the covariance
matrix of X is given by Cov(X) = E(XTX). (Note that the covariance matrix is
always positive semi-definite.) The relative entropy or KL-divergence between two
distributions fX and f
′










U(Γ) represents the uniform probability density over a compact set Γ ⊂ Rn
and N(µ, M) represents the multivariate normal distribution with mean µ ∈ Rn
and covariance M ∈ Rn×n.
For a discrete random variable X in Znq , Pr(X = x) denotes its probability at
any point x ∈ Znq .
15For example, frac([1.2, 3.4]T ) = [0.2, 0.4]T .
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1.4.1 Mathematical Model of the Communication Network
The communication network of the agents is represented by simple, undirected
graphs. That is, the communication links in a MAS of n agents is modeled via a
graph G = {V , E} where the nodes V , {1, . . . , n} denote the agents, and there
is an edge {i, j} ∈ E iff there is a direct communication channel between agents i
and j. We let Ni denote the set of neighbors of an agent i ∈ V , i.e., j ∈ Ni if and
only if {i, j} ∈ E . (Note that i 6∈ Ni since G is a simple graph.)
We say two agents i, j are connected if there is a path from i to j; since we
consider undirected graphs, this notion is symmetric. We let pi,j denote an arbitrary
path between i and j, when one exists. A graph G is connected if every distinct pair
of nodes is connected; note that a single-node graph is connected.
Definition 1.4.1. (Vertex cut) A set of nodes Vcut ⊂ V is a vertex cut of a graph
G = {V , E} if removing the nodes in Vcut (and the edges incident to those nodes)
renders the resulting graph unconnected. In this case, we say that Vcut cuts V \Vcut.
A graph is k-connected if the smallest vertex cut of the graph contains k nodes.
Let G = {V , E} be a graph. The subgraph induced by V ′ ⊂ V is the graph
G ′ = {V ′, E ′} where E ′ ⊂ E is the set of edges entirely within V ′ (i.e., E ′ = {{i, j} ∈
E | i, j ∈ V ′}). We say a graph G = {V , E} has c connected components if its
vertex set V can be partitioned into disjoint sets V1, . . . ,Vc such that (1) G has no
edges between Vi and Vj for i 6= j and (2) for all i, the subgraph induced by Vi is
connected. Clearly, if G is connected then it has one connected component.
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For a graph G = {V , E}, define its incidence matrix ∇ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}|V|×|E|
(see [60]) to be the matrix with |V| rows and |E| columns in which
∇i, e =

1 if e = {i, j} and i < j
−1 if e = {i, j} and i > j
0 otherwise.
Note that 1Tn · ∇ = 0. Let ∇∗,e denote the column of ∇ corresponding to the edge
e ∈ E .
Then we have the following result [60, Theorem 8.3.1]:
Lemma 1.4.1. Let G be an n-node graph with incidence matrix∇. Then rank(∇) =
n− c, where c is the number of connected components of G.
The graph-Laplacian L is given as L = ∇∇T , thus rank(L) = rank(∇). Let
µ1 ≥ . . . ,≥ µn−c > 0 denote the non-zero eigenvalues of L. (Eigenvalues of L are
real values because L is a symmetric real-valued matrix.) From Spectral theorem
we can decompose the graph-Laplacian L as following:
L = UDiag([µ1, . . . , µn−c, 0Tc ]T )UT
where, U ∈ Rn×n is a unitary matrix constituting of the orthogonal eigenvectors of
L. For convenience, we denote the smallest non-zero eigenvalue of Laplacian L as
µ(L).
The generalized inverse L† of the graph-Laplacian of G with c connected com-
ponents is given as following(cf. [61]):
L† = UDiag([1/µ1, . . . , 1/µn−c, 0Tc ]T )UT (1.1)
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1.5 Dissertation Organization
Excluding this introductory chapter, the dissertation is divided into 4 chapters.
Chapter 2 presents the proposed privacy protocol for internal privacy in distributed
average consensus. Chapter 3 presents an extension of the privacy protocol proposed
in Chapter 2 for internal privacy in distributed optimization. Chapter 4 is concerned
with external privacy and presents the proposed model-based scheme for external
privacy in distributed collaboration algorithms. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the
contribution of this dissertation, outlines its limitations and discusses future research
directions.
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CHAPTER 2: INTERNAL PRIVACY IN DISTRIBUTED
AVERAGE CONSENSUS
This chapter presents a distributed average consensus algorithm that guar-
antees information-theoretic (perfect) privacy of honest agents’ inputs against a
passive adversary that corrupts certain agents (also known as semi-honest agents)
in the network, as long as the set of corrupted agents is not a vertex cut of the under-
lying network topology G. This implies that for a network with (t+ 1)-connectivity,
the proposed privacy protocol guarantees information-theoretic privacy of honest
agents’ inputs against any t passively adversarial agents. The proposed protocol is
composition of a distributed privacy mechanism with any (non-private) distributed
average consensus algorithm.
The protocol involves two phases:
1. In the first phase, each agent shares correlated random values with its neigh-
bors and computes a new, “effective input” based on its original input and the
random values it shared with its neighbors.
2. In the second phase, the agents run an arbitrary distributed average consensus
protocol (e.g., flooding or any other protocol from the literature [4, 5, 62, 63])
using their effective inputs computed in the first phase (rather than their
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original inputs) to retrieve the average of their (original) inputs.
The main contribution of this dissertation is the privacy mechanism run by
the agents in the first phase, as in the second phase the agents rely on existing
distributed average consensus algorithms.
It is shown that the above, two-step process correctly computes the average
value of the agents’ original inputs as long as the average consensus protocol used
in the second phase is correct. This follows from the fact that the first phase is
designed to ensure that the average of the agents’ effective inputs is equal to the
average of their original inputs. The privacy holds in this approach—in a formal
sense and under certain conditions, as discussed in this chapter—regardless of the
average consensus protocol used in the second phase. This is proved by showing
that privacy holds even if all the effective inputs of the honest agents are revealed
to the corrupted (or adversarial) agents.
The notion of privacy is information-theoretic, adopted from the literature
on secure multi-party computation [7, 16], and holds regardless of the computation
power of the adversary. Formally, the guarantee is that the entire view of the
adversarial agents throughout the execution of the distributed average consensus
protocol can be simulated by those agents given (1) their original inputs and (2) the
average of the original inputs of the honest agents (or, equivalently, the average of
the original inputs of all the agents in the network). This holds regardless of the
true inputs of the honest agents. As a consequence, this means that the adversarial
agents learn nothing (in statistical sense) about the collective inputs of the honest
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agents from an execution of the protocol other than the average of the honest agents’
inputs, and this holds regardless of any prior knowledge that the adversarial agents
may have about the original inputs of (some of) the honest agents, or the distribution
of those inputs. It is rigorously shown that the proposed protocol satisfies this notion
of privacy as long as the set of adversarial agents does not constitute a vertex cut
of the communication network topology G.
2.1 Formal Problem Description
Consider a MAS of n agents where the communication network between agents
is represented by an undirected, simple, connected graph G = {V , E}; that is, agents
i and j have a direct communication link between them iff {i, j} ∈ E . The commu-
nication channel between two nodes is assumed to be both private and authentic;
equivalently, in the adversarial model an adversary can not eavesdrop on communi-
cations between honest agents, or tamper with their communication. (Alternately,
private and authentic communication can be ensured using standard cryptographic
techniques.)
Each agent i holds a (private) input, that is Ini = si, where si belongs to either
a set of bounded integers or a set of bounded real values.
As mentioned before, distributed average consensus is a distributed collabo-
ration protocol that allows the agents in the MAS to each compute the average of










Let C ⊂ V denote the set of adversarial agents that are corrupted by a passive
adversary, and let H = V \ C denote the remaining honest agents. As stated earlier,
the adversary is passive and thus the corrupted agents run the prescribed proto-
col. Privacy requires that the entire view of the adversary—i.e., the inputs of the
corrupted agents as well as their internal states and all the protocol messages they
received throughout execution of the distributed average consensus protocol—does
not leak (significant) information about the original inputs of the honest agents.
Note that, by definition, the adversary learns s̄ (assuming it corrupts at least one
agent) from which it can compute the sum of the inputs of the honest agents, and
so the privacy definition requires that the adversary does not learn anything more
than this.
2.1.2 Privacy Definition
Let sC denote a set of inputs held by the corrupted agents, and sH a set of
inputs held by the honest agents. Let s = [s1, . . . , sn]
T .
Definition 2.1.1. For a distributed average consensus protocol, let ViewC(s) be the
random variable denoting the view of the corrupted adversarial agents in an execu-




Definition 2.1.2. A distributed average consensus protocol is (perfectly) C-private







i, the distributions of ViewC(s) and ViewC(s
′) are identical.
Note that this definition makes sense even if |C| = n− 1, though in that case
the definition is vacuous since sH =
∑
i∈H si and so revealing the sum of the honest
agents’ inputs reveals the (single) honest agent’s input.
An alternate, perhaps more natural, way to define privacy is to require that
for any distribution S (known to the adversary) over the honest agents’ inputs,
the distribution of the honest agents’ inputs conditioned on the adversary’s view is
identical to the distribution of the honest agents’ inputs conditioned on their sum.
It is not hard to see that this is equivalent to the above definition.
2.1.3 Assumptions
Assumptions made in this chapter are the following:
(A1) The communication network G is undirected in the first phase.
(A2) Agents know the value of n.
(A3) Inputs of all the agents belong to a common set of numbers; either bounded
integers or real-values.
(A4) The adversarial agents are passive, that is they obey the prescribed average
consensus protocol without causing any disruptions.
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2.2 Proposed Protocol
As described previously, the proposed protocol has a two-phase structure (as
shown in Fig. 2.1). In the first phase, each agent i computes an “effective input” s̃i
based on its original input si and random values it shared with its neighbors; this
is done while ensuring that
∑
i si can be precisely retrieved from the value of
∑
i s̃i.
In the second phase, the agents use any (correct) distributed average consensus
protocol Π to compute
∑
i s̃i (given by the average of {ns̃i}), reduce that result to∑
i si by using a standard mathematical operation (specified later), and then divide










Consensus (     )
Main Contribution
Figure 2.1: Proposed protocol for internal privacy in distributed average consensus.
It may at first seem strange that privacy of the proposed algorithm can be
proved without knowing anything about the distributed average consensus protocol
Π used in the second phase of the algorithm. This is done by making a “worst-case”
assumption about Π, namely, that it simply reveals all the agents’ inputs to all the
agents. Such an algorithm is, of course, not at all private; however, for our purposes,
this does not immediately violate privacy because Π is run on the agents’ effective
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inputs {s̃i} rather than their true inputs {si}.
From now on, then, let the view of the adversary consist of the initial inputs
of the corrupted agents, their internal states and all the protocol messages they
receive throughout execution of the first phase of the protocol, and the vector s̃ =
[s̃1, . . . , s̃n]
T of all agents’ effective inputs at the end of the first phase. The definition
of privacy (cf. Definition 2.1.2) remains unchanged.
Before continuing with an analysis of privacy, first-phase algorithm is described
as following for both class of inputs; bounded integers and bounded real-values.
2.2.1 Bounded Integral Inputs
The inputs si ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} for some publicly known, integer bound q > 1
and let p be an integer such that p > n · (q − 1) ≥
∑
i si.
The first phase of the protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Each agent i ∈ V chooses independent, uniform values rij ∈ Zp for all j ∈ Ni,
and sends rij to agent j.




(rji − rij) mod p, (2.1)
where ai ∈ Zp.
3. Each agent i ∈ V computes effective input



















(rji − rij) mod p
= 0 mod p,




i si mod p. Since
∑
i si < p by choice
of p, this implies that
∑
i s̃i mod p is equal to
∑
i si over the integers, and hence
correctness of overall algorithm (i.e., including the second phase) follows.
2.2.2 Bounded Real-Valued Inputs
By scaling appropriately1, the inputs si ∈ [0, 1/n), where n is the total number
of agents in the network.
1. Each agent i ∈ V chooses independent, uniform values rij ∈ [0, 1) for all
j ∈ Ni, and sends rij to agent j.







where ai ∈ [0, 1).
3. Each agent i ∈ V computes effective input
s̃i = frac(si + ai). (2.4)
1Let each agent be associated with a finite (bounded) real-valued input xi ∈ [0, q), where q is





































i si < 1 ( as si ∈ [0, 1),
this implies that frac (
∑
i s̃i) is equal to
∑
i si, and hence correctness of overall al-
gorithm (i.e., including the second phase) follows.
The algorithm, for both the cases, is illustrated by an example in Section 2.3.
Note: In the above proposed protocols, the agents are not required to send
{rij} simultaneously and the delay between transmission and reception of these
random values does not affect the protocol is any way as long as the agents are
able to transmit these values successfully. The second phase can start once agents
have successfully exchanged values of {rij} with their neighbors in the network G.
Therefore, phase one does not require synchronicity between the agents, and an
asynchronous Π (refer [5, 6]) renders the overall two-phase protocol asynchronous.
2.2.3 Privacy Analysis
It is shown here that C-privacy holds as long as C is not a vertex cut of G.
The following arguments are given for the case of integral inputs. However,
owing to the similarities between the mod operation and the fractional part3 the
2frac(x + y) = frac (frac(x) + frac(y)) and frac(−x) = 1− frac(x).
3Fractional part is essentially a mod operation for reals.
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arguments given for proving the privacy result for the case of integral inputs extend
readily for the case of real-valued inputs.
For an edge e = {i, j} in the graph with i < j, define4
be = rji − rij mod p.
Let b = [be1 , . . .] be the collection of such values for all the edges in G. If we
let a = [a1, . . . , an]
T denote the masks used by the agents, then we have5
a = ∇ · b mod p.
Since the values {rij} are uniform and independent in Zp, it is easy to see that the
values {be}e∈E are uniform and independent in Zp as well6. Thus, a is uniformly
distributed over the vectors in the span (over Zp) of the columns of ∇, which is
denoted by L(∇) and formally given as
L(∇) = {∇ · b mod p | b ∈ Z|E|p }
The following is easy to prove using the fact that rank(∇) = n − 1 when G is
connected (cf. Lemma 1.4.1):
Lemma 2.2.1. If G is connected then a is uniformly distributed over all points in
Znp subject to the constraint
∑
i ai = 0 mod p.
4For case of reals, we have be = frac(rji − rij)
5For case of reals, this reduces to a = frac(∇ · b).
6If x and y are two independent random variables in Zp with at least one of them being uniformly
distributed (in Zp), then z = x + y mod p is uniformly distributed in Zp. Similarly, if x and y are
two independent random variables in [0, 1) with at least one of them being uniformly distributed
(in [0, 1)), then z = frac(x + y) is uniformly distributed in [0, 1).
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Proof. The proof is obvious for n = 1. Henceforth, n > 1.
Choose a subset E ′ of E with n− 1 edges such that G ′ = {V , E ′} is connected
(such a subset E ′ is guaranteed to exist if G is connected). Therefore, all the n− 1
columns of ∇′ (incidence matrix of G ′) are linearly independent. Combining this
with the fact that all non-zero values in ∇′ are either −1 or 1 implies,
a′ = ∇′ · b =
∑
e∈E ′
∇′∗,e · be mod p
is uniformly distributed over pn−1 points in
L(∇′) = {∇′ · b mod p | b ∈ Zn−1p },
as {be}e∈E ′ are uniformly distributed in Zn−1p .
Note that 1Tn ·a′ = 0 mod p (as 1Tn∇′ = 0T|E| for G ′ being undirected). Therefore,





i = 0 mod p.
The rest of the proof follows from induction of edges.
In case E ′ = E ( or E has only n − 1 edges), the proof concludes here as
a = a′. Otherwise, choose an edge e′ from the set of remaining edges E ′ \ E and
let E ′′ = E ′ ∪ {e′}. Note that as G ′ is connected, therefore ∇∗,e′ (column of ∇






7It follows from the fact that there exists a path in G′ between the terminal nodes of the edge
e′ as G′ is connected.
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where, µe ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for all e ∈ E ′ .
From (2.5), each point a′′ of L(∇′′) (span of the columns of the incidence








∇′∗,e · (be + µebe′) mod p
As {be}e∈E ′ is uniformly distributed over all point in Zn−1p and be is independent
from all {be}e∈E ′ , therefore {be + µebe′ mod p}e∈E ′ is uniformly distributed over all
the points in Zn−1p . This implies, a′′ is uniformly distributed over pn−1 points in
L(∇′′).
Induction of edges in this manner leads to the conclusion that a is uniformly
distributed over pn−1 points in L(∇)
Note that 1Tn ·a = 0 mod p as 1Tn∇ = 0T|E| (due to the fact that G is undirected).
Therefore, the above result implies that a is uniformly distributed over Znp subject
to the constraint that
∑
i ai = 0 mod p. 
The above lemma when combined with the fact that s̃i = si + ai mod p yields
the following result.
Lemma 2.2.2. If G is connected, then the effective inputs s̃ are uniformly dis-








Since s̃i = si + ai mod p and si, ai are independent, we get
Pr (s̃|s) = Pr (a = (s̃− s) mod p)





i ai = 0 mod p
0 , o.w.








i si mod p
0 , o.w.
when G is connected. 
The above Lemma implies privacy for the case when C = ∅, i.e., when there
are no corrupted agents. In that case, the view of the adversary consists only of
the effective inputs s̃, and Lemma 2.2.2 shows that the distribution of those values
depends only on the sum of the agents’ true inputs. Below, this line of argument is
extended to the case of nonempty C.
Fix some set C of corrupted agents, and recall that H = V \ C. Let EC denote
the set of edges incident to C, and let EH = E \ EC be the edges incident only to
honest agents. Note that now the adversary’s view contains (information that allows
it to compute) {be}e∈EC in addition to the honest agents’ effective inputs {s̃i}i∈H.
The key observation enabling a proof of privacy is that the values {be}e∈EH are
uniform and independent in Zp even conditioned on the values of {be}e∈EC . Thus,
8Total number of points in Znp whose elements add up to 0 under mod p are p
n−1.
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as long as C is not a vertex cut of G, an argument as earlier implies that the masks
{ai}i∈H are uniformly distributed in Z|H|p subject to
∑
i∈H ai = −
∑
i∈C ai mod p
(conditioned on knowledge of the values {be}e∈EC), and hence the effective inputs










given the values of {si} and {s̃i}i∈C (again, even conditioned on knowledge of
the {be}e∈EC). Since the right-hand side of the above equation can be computed
from the effective inputs of the corrupted agents, the {be}e∈EC , and the sum of the
honest agents’ inputs, this implies:
Theorem 2.2.1. If C is not a vertex cut of G, then the proposed distributed average
consensus protocol is perfectly C-private.
Proof. Let GH = {H, EH} be the graph of honest agents (and edges incident to
only honest agents) and ∇H be its incidence matrix.
Note that
ViewC(s) = {{si}i∈C, {s̃i}, {be}e∈EC} .
Therefore, to prove C-privacy it suffices to show that the joint distribution of s̃H and









i, when GH is connected or C is not a vertex cut of G.




∇i,e · be +
∑
e∈EC
∇i,e · be mod p
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Note that the values {be}e∈EH are uniformly and independently distributed in Zp
(given the values {be}e∈EC).
From Lemma 2.2.1, the values {
∑
e∈EH ∇i,ebe mod p}i∈H are uniformly dis-




e∈EH ∇i,ebe) = 0 mod p when
GH is connected.





i∈H ai = −
∑




e∈EC ∇i,e ·be mod p, ∀i ∈ C and aH denotes the vector of honest agents
masks {ai}i∈H.
Combining the above with Lemma 2.2.2 implies, (s̃H is the vector of the effec-
tive inputs of the honest agents {s̃i}i∈H)
Pr (s̃H|sH, {be}e∈EC) = 1/p|H|−1 (2.6)










when GH is connected. (ai =
∑
e∈EC ∇i,ebe mod p for every i ∈ C.)
Combining (2.6) with the fact that all the values of {be}e∈E are independent
to the inputs {si} implies,
Pr (s̃H, {be}e∈EC |sH) ≡ Pr (s̃H, {be}e∈EC |s′H)











Hence, if GH is connected then for an execution of the proposed distributed average
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consensus protocol,
Pr (ViewC(s)) ≡ Pr (ViewC(s′))







As a corollary, we have
Corollary 2.2.1. If G is (t+1)-connected, then for any C with |C| ≤ t the proposed
distributed average consensus protocol is perfectly C-private.
Note: The results states in Theorem 2.2.1 and Corollary 2.2.1 hold verbatim
for the case of bounded real-valued inputs, and can be formally shown using similar
arguments as above. The only difference is that for the case of bounded real-valued
inputs the analysis involves fractional parts instead of modulus operations.
2.3 Illustration
For demonstration of the proposed distributed average consensus protocol con-
sider a simple network of 3 agents with V = {1, 2, 3} and E = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}},
as shown in Fig. 2.2.
2.3.1 Bounded Integral Inputs
Let the values of q and p be 10 and 30, respectively.
Consider an instance where s1 = 4, s2 = 7 and s3 = 3.










Figure 2.2: Illustration of the proposed distributed average consensus protocol. Arrows (in blue)
indicate the flow of information over the communication links.
1. As shown in Fig. 2.2, all pair of adjacent agents i and j exchange the respective
values of rij and rji (chosen independently and uniformly in Zp) with each
other. Consider a particular instance where
r12 = 14, r21 = 11, r23 = 17, r32 = 5, r31 = 3, r13 = 8
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2. The agents compute their respective masks,
a1 = ((r21 − r12) + (r31 − r13)) mod p
= ((11− 14) + (3− 8)) mod 30 = 22
a2 = ((r12 − r21) + (r32 − r23)) mod p
= ((14− 11) + (5− 17)) mod 30 = 21
a3 = ((r13 − r31) + (r23 − r32)) mod p
= ((8− 3) + (17− 5)) mod 30 = 17
(one can verify that (a1 + a2 + a3) mod 30 = 0)
3. The agents compute their respective effective inputs,
s̃1 = (s1 + a1) mod p = (4 + 22) mod 30 = 26
s̃2 = (s2 + a2) mod p = (7 + 21) mod 30 = 28
s̃3 = (s3 + a3) mod p = (3 + 17) mod 30 = 20
After the first phase, each agent uses a (non-private) distributed average con-
sensus protocol Π in the second phase to compute (1/3)
∑
i s̃i (it can be easily to
verified that
∑
i s̃i mod 30 =
∑
i si = 14).
Let C = {3} and so, EC = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}. It is easy to see that C does
not cut the graph G and therefore, for any pair of inputs s1 ∈ Z10 and s2 ∈ Z10
that satisfy s1 + s2 = 11, s̃1 and s̃2 are uniformly distributed over Z230 subject to
s̃1 + s̃2 = 24 mod 30.
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2.3.2 Bounded Real-Valued Inputs
Let s1 = 0.1, s2 = 0.2 and s3 = 0.15.
In first phase, the agents execute the following steps
1. As shown in Fig. 2.2, all pair of adjacent agents i and j exchange the respective
values of rij and rji (chosen independently and uniformly in [0, 1)) with each
other. Consider a particular instance where: r12 = 0.1, r21 = 0.5, r23 =
0.7, r32 = 0.4, r31 = 0.3 and r13 = 0.8.
2. The agents compute their respective masks,
a1 = frac ((r21 − r12) + (r31 − r13)) = 0.9
Similarly, a2 = 0.3 and a3 = 0.8. (One can verify that frac(a1 +a2 +a3) = 0.)
3. The agents compute their respective effective inputs,
s̃1 = frac(s1 + a1) = frac(0.1 + 0.9) = 0.0
Similarly, s̃2 = 0.5 and s̃3 = 0.95.
After the first phase, each agent uses a (non-private) distributed average con-
sensus protocol Π in the second phase to compute (1/3)
∑





i si = 0.45).
Let C = {3} and so, EC = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}. It is easy to see that C does not
cut the graph G and therefore, for any pair of inputs s1 ∈ [0, 1/3) and s2 ∈ [0, 1/3)
that satisfy s1 + s2 = .3 the joint distribution of s̃1 and s̃2 is uniform over [0, 1)
2
such that frac(s̃1 + s̃2) = 0.5.
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2.4 Extension
The privacy guarantee given by Theorem 2.2.1 can be easily extended for the
case when C is indeed a vertex cut by relaxing our definition of C-privacy to (C, H)-
privacy as following. Let set H now represent a subset of V \ C, that is, now we
are interested in privacy of only some of the honest agents instead of all the honest
agents. Then, we can re-define privacy as following.
Definition 2.4.1. A distributed average consensus protocol is (perfectly) (C, H)-









of ViewC(s) and ViewC(s
′) are identical.
Similarly as above, this definition makes sense even if |H| = 1, though in that
case the definition is vacuous since sH =
∑
i∈H si and so revealing the sum of the
inputs of the honest agents H reveals the (single) honest agent’s input!
Essentially, if the view of the adversary remains same for any two sets of inputs
of the honest agents H that sum up to the same value then no information is leaked
to the adversary about the inputs of H other than their common sum. Note that C-
privacy is equivalent (C, V\C)-privacy. Therefore, if a distributed average consensus
protocol is C-privacy then it is (C, H)-private for all H ⊆ V \ C. (This is the reason
why Definition 2.4.1 is a relaxation of Definition 2.1.2.)
From Theorem 2.2.1 we infer that -
Theorem 2.4.1. The proposed distributed average consensus protocol is (C, H)-
private if C does not cut H.
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Alternately, if the set of agents H are connected in the sub-graph GC = G \


















Figure 2.3: An example illustrating the internal privacy guarantee in the proposed distributed
average consensus protocol.
For example, consider the scenario shown in Fig. 2.3, where the corrupted
agents C = {3, 5, 10} cut the graph (communication network) into 3 connected
components with set of agents H1 = {1, 2}, H2 = {4} and H3 = {6, 7, 8, 9} (and
edges incident to the respective honest agents). As mentioned before, the proposed
distributed protocol preserves the privacy of each group of honest agents Hi, i =
1, 2 3 in the sense of Definition 2.4.1. However, as |H2| = 1 the value of s4 gets
revealed to the adversary.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The proposed two-phase approach for distributed average consensus guaran-
tees internal privacy (perfectly) of honest agents if the passively adversarial agents
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(or agents corrupted by a passive adversary) do not form a vertex cut in the un-
derlying communication network G. This implies that if the network has (t + 1)-
connectivity then the proposed distributed average consensus protocol preserves
internal privacy of honest agents in presence of at most t number of arbitrary ad-
versarial agents in the MAS. The only information that the adversary gets on the
inputs of honest agents is their sum (or average). As an extension of this privacy
result, it is shown that the proposed privacy protocol can preserve internal privacy
of any subset of honest agents as long as that group of honest agents is not cut by
the adversarial agents.
Now, consider a slightly different adversarial model where every agent in the
network is dishonest, but are not colluding with each other. In that case, as a
consequence of the obtained privacy result, a network of 2-connectivity is sufficient
enough to protect the privacy of an agent’s input against all the other agents in the
network.
The main contribution of the proposed two-phase approach is the privacy
mechanism, implemented by the agents in the first phase to mask their original in-
puts and generate effective inputs. The internal privacy then follows, as rigorously
shown, from the inability (in statistical sense) of the adversarial agents to deter-
mine the masks used by the honest agents in the first phase to compute the effective
inputs. As the privacy mechanism does not require synchronicity between agents,
thus if the average consensus protocol used in the second phase is asynchronous,
then the overall proposed distributed average consensus protocol is asynchronous.
Furthermore, the agents can choose any distributed average consensus algorithm
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in the second phase to compute the sum of their effective inputs. Consequentially,
the proposed two-phase approach can be interpreted as a general approach for con-
structing distributed average consensus protocols to ensure internal privacy up to a
certain extent.
2.5.1 Limitations
Limitations of the proposed privacy protocol are as following:
1. The agents are required to know the value of n, that is the size of the network.
2. The proposed privacy protocol does not prevent an adversary from knowing
the sum of all the honest agents.
3. If the adversarial agents form a vertex cut then some of the honest agents might
lose privacy of their inputs to the adversary. For instance, if all the neighbors
of an honest agent are adversarial then internal privacy of that agent’s input
is not protected by the proposed privacy protocol.
4. The proposed privacy protocol can not preserve external privacy of the agents
(i.e. privacy of agents’ inputs against eavesdroppers). Alternately, it relies on
existing cryptographic encryption schemes for external privacy.
5. The communication links between the agents during the privacy mechanism
are assumed undirected. However, the agents are not required to communicate
simultaneously and given the advancements in communication technology, full-
duplex communication has become commonplace.
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6. For now, the proposed protocol is only applicable for internal privacy in dis-
tributed collaborations wherein the collaboration objective is to compute the
sum (or average) of agents’ inputs. The protocol might not be effective for in-
ternal privacy in distributed collaborations wherein the collaboration objective
is to compute any other general function on agents’ inputs.
7. The adversarial agents are assumed passive. In practice, there can exist agents
in the network that are actively adversarial, i.e. they can disrupt the prescribed
distributed collaboration protocol including the privacy mechanism. In that
case, the proposed privacy protocol might not be effective.
2.5.2 Future Research
In order to overcome the aforementioned limitations, future research can be
pursued in the following directions.
1. Investigate if the sufficient condition for internal privacy of all honest agents
is also necessary. This will reduce the required redundancy on connectivity of
the communication network.
2. Explore conditions under which the proposed privacy protocol can also pre-
serve external privacy, without relying on cryptographic encryptions.
3. Design a similar two-phase approach for internal privacy in distributed com-
putations of more general functions on agents’ inputs than just the average
(or sum).
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4. Explore the applicability of the proposed privacy protocol if some of the agents
in the network are actively malicious.
5. Check if the proposed protocol can protect internal privacy of agents’ internal
states that are generated during the intermediate stage of other distributed
collaboration algorithms. This might help in extending the applicability of the
proposed privacy protocol for a larger class of distributed collaborations.
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNAL PRIVACY IN DISTRIBUTED
OPTIMIZATION
This chapter presents an extension of the privacy protocol proposed in Chap-
ter 2, for internal privacy in distributed optimization. Specifically, it is shown that
following a similar two-phase approach, as described in Chapter 2, honest agents
can preserve privacy of the affine parts of their costs (or inputs) against passively
adversarial agents as long as the set of adversarial agents do not constitute a ver-
tex cut in the underlying communication network G. The proposed protocol is a
composition of a distributed privacy mechanism with any (non-private) distributed
optimization algorithm.
Similar to the previous chapter, Chapter 2, the proposed approach constitutes
of two phases:
1. In the first phase, each agent shares correlated random values with its neigh-
bors and then computes a new, “effective cost” based on its original cost and
the random values shared with its neighbors.
2. In the second phase, the agents run any arbitrary distributed optimization
protocol to minimize the aggregate of their effective costs, instead of their
original costs.
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The privacy mechanism is designed to ensure that the aggregate of all agents’ ef-
fective costs is equivalent to the aggregate of the agents’ original costs. Therefore,
the minima of the aggregate of effective costs is same as the minima of the aggre-
gate of original costs. Furthermore, the privacy holds in this approach—in a formal
sense and under certain conditions, as described in this chapter—regardless of the
distributed optimization protocol used in the second phase. This is shown by prov-
ing privacy under the worst-case scenario where all the effective costs of the honest
agents are revealed to all the agents (including the adversarial agents) in the second
phase.
Informally speaking, internal privacy requires that the adversarial agents learn
very little (in statistical sense) about the collective affine parts of the original costs
of honest agents in an execution of the protocol (described above) other than the
aggregate of the affine parts of the honest agents’ costs. This holds regardless of
any prior knowledge that the adversarial agents may have about the costs of (some
of) the honest agents. It is proved that the privacy protocol satisfies this notion of
privacy as long as the set of adversarial agents do not constitute a vertex cut of the
communication network topology G.
3.1 Formal Problem Description
Consider a MAS of n agents where the communication network between agents
is represented by an undirected, simple, connected graph G = {V , E}; that is, agents
i and j have a direct communication link between them iff {i, j} ∈ E . The commu-
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nication channel between two nodes is assumed to be both private and authentic;
equivalently, in the adversarial model an adversary can not eavesdrop on communi-
cations between honest agents, or tamper with their communication. (Alternately,
private and authentic communication can be ensured using standard cryptographic
techniques.)
The input Ini of each agent is a function hi : Rm → R. A distributed optimiza-
tion algorithm is an interactive protocol that enables agents to solve the following







Let C ⊂ V denote the set of adversarial agents that are corrupted by a passive
adversary, and let H = V \ C denote the remaining honest agents. As stated earlier,
the adversary is passive and thus the corrupted agents run the prescribed protocol.
Privacy requires that the entire view of the adversary—i.e., the costs of the corrupted
agents as well as their internal states and all the protocol messages they received
throughout execution of the protocol—does not leak (significant) information about
the costs of the honest agents other than the aggregate of their costs in the solution
set of (3.1). Note that, by definition, the adversary learns
∑
i hi(x
∗) for every point
x∗ belonging to the solution set of (3.1) (assuming it corrupts at least one agent),
from which it can compute the sum of the costs of the honest agents at x∗ and in the




i∈H hi. Therefore, in this dissertation, the privacy definition (as formulated
in the subsequent subsection) requires that the adversary (or the adversarial agents)
does not learn anything significant (quantified later) about the affine parts of the




i denote the affine part
1 of cost hi, i.e. h
(a)
i (x) = α
T
i x, where αi ∈ Rm.
Let αki denote the k-th element of the affine coefficient of agent i and α
k =
[αk1, . . . , α
k
n]
T be the vector of k-th elements of all the affine coefficients, for k ∈ [m].
Let α = {αi} and α′ = {α′i} be two sets of affine coefficients, then the distance be-
tween α and α′, represented by dist(α, α′), is simply the accumulation of Euclidean





The privacy of the affine parts of honest agents’ costs (against C) is equivalent
to the privacy of the coefficients of honest agents’ costs {αi}i∈H. Thus, the privacy
definition is formulated for the privacy of {αi}i∈H.
Let αC = {αi}i∈C denote the affine coefficients of corrupted agents’ costs, and
αH = {αi}i∈H denote the affine coefficients of honest agents’ costs.
Definition 3.1.1. For a distributed optimization protocol, let ViewC(α) be the
random variable denoting the information learned by the corrupted agents (or view
1Every function h(x) can be decomposed as h(x) = h(na)(x) + h(a)(x), where h(a)(x) is affine
in x (called the affine part of h) and h(na)(x) is not affine in x.
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of the corrupted agents) in an execution of the distributed optimization protocol
where the agents begin holding costs with affine coefficients α = {αi}.
Then:
Definition 3.1.2. A distributed optimization protocol is (C, ε)-affine private if for











′)) ≤ ε dist(α, α′)2
Note that this definition makes sense even if |C| = n− 1, though in that case
the definition is vacuous since αH =
∑
i∈H αi and so revealing the sum of the honest
agents’ costs reveals the affine coefficients of honest agent’s cost.
In other words, the privacy definition above says that it is very difficult for
the adversary to distinguish between two possible sets of affine coefficients of honest
agents’ costs, if they are close enough (in terms of the Euclidean distance) to each
other and has the same aggregate(or sum).
3.1.3 Assumptions
The assumptions made in this chapter are as following:
(A1) The communication network G is undirected in the first phase.
(A3) All the agents’ costs have a common domain Rm.
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(A4) The adversarial agents are passive, that is they obey the prescribed protocol
without causing any disruptions.
3.2 Proposed Protocol
As described above, the protocol has a two-phase structure (as shown in
Fig. 3.1). In the first phase, each agent i computes an “effective cost” h̃i based
on its original cost hi and correlated random values it shares with its neighbors;
this is done while ensuring that
∑
i h̃i(x) is equal to
∑
i hi(x) for all x ∈ Rm (shown
below). In the second phase, the agents use any distributed optimization protocol






This (as will be shown) gives the solution to the original optimization problem (3.1).
Also, in the first phase the effective cost of each agent is obtained by adding an affine
cost to the original cost, thus h̃i is convex if hi is convex. Hence, most of the existing
distributed optimization (including the protocols that require individual costs to be
convex) can be used in the second phase to solve (3.2) without any change in the
order of their computational complexity.
It may at first seem strange that the privacy of the algorithm can be proved
without knowing anything about the distributed optimization protocol Π used in
the second phase. This is done by making a “worst-case” assumption about Π,
namely, that it simply reveals all the agents’ effective costs to all the agents. Such






Protocol (     )
Main Contribution
Figure 3.1: Proposed protocol for internal privacy in distributed optimization.
not immediately violate privacy because Π is run on the agents’ effective costs {h̃i}
instead of their original costs {hi}.
From now on, then, view of the adversary consists of the original costs of the
corrupted (adversarial) agents, their internal states and all the protocol messages
they receive throughout execution of the first phase of our protocol, and all the
agents’ effective costs h̃ = [h̃1, . . . , h̃n]
T obtained at the end of the first phase. Our
definition of privacy (cf. Definition 3.1.2) remains unchanged.
The first phase of the protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Each agent i ∈ V chooses independent vectors rij ∼ N(0m, σ2Diag(1m)) from
Rm for all j ∈ Ni, and sends rij to agent j. Here, σ ∈ R.




(rji − rij), (3.3)
3. Each agent i ∈ V computes effective cost h̃i, given as following,
h̃i(x) = hi(x) + a
T



















(rji − rij) = 0




i hi and hence correctness of the overall
algorithm (i.e., including the second phase) follows. Now, all that remains is the
privacy analysis.
Note that the privacy mechanism, described above, is asynchronous as the
agents are not required to receive or send {rij}{i,j}∈E simultaneously.
The proposed algorithm is illustrated by example in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Privacy Analysis
It is shown here that (C, ε)-affine privacy holds as long as C is not a vertex cut
of G.
For an edge e = {i, j} in the graph with i < j, define
be = rji − rij.
Let bk = [bke1 , . . .]
T be the vector of the k-th elements of all such vectors be for all
the edges in G. Let ak = [ak1, . . . , akn]T be the column vector constituting of k-th
elements of the masks computed by the agents, then
ak = ∇ · bk.
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Since the element of vector rij are identical and independent from each other with
normal distribution N(0, σ2) for all {i, j} ∈ E , it is easy to see that the values
{bke}e∈E are independent and have identical normal distribution N(0, 2σ2) in R, for
all k in [m]. Consequentially, ak is normally distributed over Rn with mean and
covariance equal to 0n and 2σ
2L, respectively for all k ∈ [m]. Specifically, the











where, det∗(4πσ2L) = (4πσ2)n−c
∏n−c
i=1 µi (product of non-zero eigenvalues). As
rank(L) = n − 1 when G is connected (cf. Lemma 1.4.1) and 1Tnak = 0, ∀k ∈ [m]
(as G is undirected, thus 1Tn∇ = 0T|E|), we get:
Lemma 3.2.1. If G is connected then ak is normally distributed over all points




i = 0 for all k ∈ [m], with mean value
E(ak) = 0n and covariance Cov(ak) = 2σ2L.
Since α̃i = αi + ai, the above lemma implies the following.
Lemma 3.2.2. If G is connected then the k-th elements of the effective affine coef-
ficients α̃k = [α̃k1, . . . , α̃
k
n]









i for all k ∈ [m], with mean value E(α̃k) = αk = [αk1, . . . , αkn]T
and covariance Cov(α̃k) = 2σ2L, given the values of {αi}.
Proof. As α̃i = αi+ai,∀i ∈ V , therefore α̃ki = αki +aki for every i ∈ V and k ∈ [m].
(α̃ki and α
k
i denote the k-th elements of α̃i and αi, respectively.)
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If we let α̃k = [α̃k1, . . . , α̃
k
n]
T and αk = [αk1, . . . , α
k
n]
T then α̃k = αk + ak, ∀k ∈
[m]. As ai is independent of αi for all i ∈ V , thus Lemma 3.2.1 implies that







i with E(α̃k) = αk and Cov(α̃k) = 2σ2L for all k ∈ [m], given the
values of {αi}. 
Let fα̃|α and α̃|α′ denote the conditional probability density function (or distri-
bution) of the collective effective affine coefficients α̃ = [α̃1, . . . , α̃n] given the true
affine coefficients as α = {αi} and α′ = {α′i}, respectively. Then, using Lemma
3.2.2, we get:
Theorem 3.2.1. If G is connected then
DKL(fα̃|α||fα̃|α′) ≤ ε dist(α, α′)2
for all affine coefficients α = [α1, . . . , αn] and α







i with ε = 1/(4σ
2µ(L)), where µ(L) is the smallest non-zero eigenvalue of L.




k − αk) and fα̃k|α′(α̃k) = fak(α̃k − α′k)∀k ∈ [m]
where αk and α′k represent the k-th elements of coefficients {αi} and {α′i}, respec-










(α̃k − αk)TL†(αk − αk)− (α̃k − α′k)TL†(α̃k − α′k)
}
, ∀k ∈ [m]








(αk − α′k)TL†(2α̃k − αk − α′k), ∀k ∈ [m]
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(α− α′)TL†(2a+ α− α′)fak(a)da =
1
2σ2
(αk − α′k)TL†E(ak) + 1
4σ2




(αk − α′k)TL†(αk − α′k), ∀k ∈ [m]
As 1Tn (α
k − α′k) = 0n, i.e. αk − α′k is orthogonal to 1n and rank(L) = n − 1 when







, ∀k ∈ [m]
Note that different elements ak and ak
′
of the masks are independent of each















with ε = 1/(4σ2µ(L)). 
The above implies (C, ε) - affine privacy of the proposed distributed optimiza-
tion algorithm for the case when C = ∅, i.e., when there are no corrupted agents. In
that case, the view of the adversary consists only of the effective affine coefficients α̃,
and Lemma 3.2.2 shows that the distribution of those values depends only on the
sum of the agents’ true affine coefficients. Below, this line of argument is extended
to the case of nonempty C.
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Fix some set C of corrupted agents, and recall that H = V \ C. Let EC denote
the set of edges incident to C, and let EH = E \ EC be the edges incident only
to honest agents. We refer to GH = {H, EH} as the honest graph and let LH
denote the graph-Laplacian of GH. Note that now the adversary’s view contains
(information that allows it to compute) {be}e∈EC in addition to the honest agents’
affine coefficients {α̃i}i∈H.
The key observation enabling a proof of privacy is that the values {bke}e∈EH are
independent in R|H| even conditioned on the values of {be}e∈EC , for every k ∈ [m].
Thus, owing to Theorem 3.2.1, we get the following privacy guarantee:
Theorem 3.2.2. If C is not a vertex cut of G, then the proposed distributed opti-
mization protocol is (C, ε)-affine private, with ε = 1/(4σ2µ(LH)).
Proof. As C is not a vertex cut of G, this implies GH is connected.
The view of the adversarial agents is given by
ViewC(α) = {{αi}i∈C, {α̃i}, {be}e∈EC}
As α̃i = αi + ai, ∀i and
∑













∇i,e · bke , ∀i ∈ C
for every k ∈ [m].
Let fα̃H|αH,{be}e∈EC and fα̃H|α
′
H,{be}e∈EC represent the conditional probability den-
sity function of αH given {be}e∈EC and the values of the original affine coefficients
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of honest agents as αH = {αi}i∈H and α′H = {α′i}i∈H, respectively. Then, Theo-
rem 3.2.1 implies









i with ε = 1/(4σ
2µ(LH)), where µ(LH) is the smallest non-zero eigenvalue
of LH.
As {be}e∈EC are chosen independently of the affine coefficients {αi}, the above
implies
DKL(ViewC(α)||ViewC(α′)) ≤ ε dist(α, α′)2
when GH is connected, for any two sets of affine coefficients α = {αi} and α′ = {α′i}
that satisfy αi = α
′







As a corollary, we have
Corollary 3.2.1. If G is (t+1)-connected, then for any C with |C| ≤ t the proposed
distributed optimization protocol is (C, ε)-affine private.
The subsequent subsection discusses the relationship between the vertex ex-
pansion of GH and privacy strength of the proposed privacy protocol.
3.2.2 Vertex Expansion and Privacy Strength
The value of ε is a quantitative measure of privacy, and smaller is the value
of ε higher is the privacy. As is shown in Theorem 3.2.2, ε is inversely proportional
to the variance of random values added to the affine coefficients, which is quite
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intuitive. As the proposed privacy mechanism does not affect the accuracy of the
distributed optimization protocol, thus we can choose value of σ appropriately for
desirable privacy strength.
It is interesting to note that the value of ε is inversely proportional to the
smallest non-zero eigenvalue of the Laplacian of the graph LH. From Cheeger’s
Theorem [64], we know that
φ2GH
2
≤ µ(LH) ≤ 2φGH (3.6)
where, φGH is a non-negative real number that is known as the vertex expansion of
graph GH. Value of φGH roughly indicates how close GH is to being not connected
(specific form is omitted here, interested readers can refer to [65, 66]). The value
of φGH is zero if and only if GH is not connected. Thus, owing to the Cheeger’s
inequality (3.6) the value of ε in Theorem 3.2.2 is bounded above as
ε ≤ 1
2σ2φ2GH
This means that higher vertex expansion of the honest graph GH implies better
privacy.
3.3 Illustration
Consider a simple network of 3 agents with V = {1, 2, 3} and
E = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}, as shown in Fig. 3.2.
Let h1(x) = (x− x1)2, h2(x) = (x− x2)2 and h3(x) = (x− x3)2, where x ∈ R




Figure 3.2: Illustration of the proposed distributed optimization protocol. Arrows (in blue)
indicate the flow of information over communication links.
the agents use a consensus-based gradient method [29] for distributed optimization
of the aggregate
∑
i hi(x) then the adversarial agent 3 acquires knowledge of x1
and x2 (using the received optimal estimates of 1 and 2 at each time-step of the
optimization algorithm). Now, to prevent this loss of privacy, the agents implement
the proposed privacy protocol in the following manner.
In phase one, the agents execute the following steps
1. As shown in Fig. 3.2, all pairs of adjacent agents i and j exchange the re-
spective values rij and rji (chosen independently and following a normal dis-
tribution, with mean 0 and variance σ = 1, in R) with each other. Consider a
particular instance where
r12 = 0.1, r21 = 0.5, r23 = 0.7, r32 = 0.4, r31 = 0.3, r13 = 0.8
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2. The agents compute their respective masks,
a1 = (r21 − r12) + (r31 − r13) = −0.1
Similarly, a2 = −0.7 and a3 = 0.8. (One can verify that (a1 + a2 + a3) = 0.)
3. The agents compute their respective effective costs,
h̃1(x) = (x− x1)2 − 0.1x = x2 − (2x1 + 0.1)x+ x21
Similarly, h̃2(x) = x
2 − (2x2 + 0.7)x+ x22 and h̃3(x) = x3 − (2x3 − 0.8)x+ x23.
After phase one, each agent uses a (non-private) distributed optimization al-
gorithm Π in the second phase to compute the value of x that minimizes
∑
i h̃i (it





Here, as agent 3 does not cut the honest agents 1 and 2, therefore an adversary
that corrupts agent 3 can only determine 2x1 + 2x2 with certainty and not the





{(x1 − x′1)2 + (x2 − x′2)2}











The proposed two-phase approach for distributed optimization guarantees in-
ternal privacy of the affine parts of honest agents’ costs if the passively adversarial
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agents (or agents corrupted by a passive adversary) do not form a vertex cut in the
underlying communication network G. This implies that the proposed distributed
optimization protocol preserves internal privacy of the affine parts of agents’ costs
in presence of at most t arbitrary adversarial agents if the communication network
has (t+ 1)-connectivity. The only information that the adversary gets on the affine
parts of honest agents’ costs is their sum (or average). Using similar arguments as
in Section 2.4, it can be shown that the proposed privacy protocol preserves privacy
of the affine parts of the costs of a group of honest agents – in a formal sense as
defined for all the honest agents – that are not cut by the adversarial agents.
Consider a slightly different adversarial model wherein every agent in the net-
work is dishonest, but are not colluding with each other. In that case, as a con-
sequence of the obtained privacy result, a network of 2-connectivity is sufficient
enough to protect the privacy of the affine parts of an agent’s costs against all the
other agents in the network.
The main contribution of the proposed two-phase approach is the privacy
mechanism, implemented by the agents in the first phase to mask their original
costs and generate effective costs. The internal privacy then follows, as rigorously
shown, from the inability (in statistical sense) of the adversarial agents to deter-
mine the masks used by the honest agents. As the privacy mechanism does not
require synchronicity between agents, thus if the distributed optimization protocol
used in the second phase is asynchronous, then the overall proposed protocol is
asynchronous as well. Moreover, the agents can choose any distributed optimiza-
tion algorithm in the second phase on their effective costs. Therefore, the proposed
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two-phase approach can be interpreted as a general way of constructing distributed
optimization protocols to protect internal privacy of the participating agents.
3.4.1 Limitations
Limitations of the proposed privacy protocol are as following:
1. The proposed privacy protocol only guarantees internal privacy of the affine
parts of honest agents’ costs and not the entire costs. However, similar ap-
proach can be readily used to protect internal privacy of other higher-order
coefficients in the agents’ costs.
2. The proposed privacy protocol does not prevent the adversarial agents from
knowing the aggregate of the affine parts of honest agents’ costs.
3. If the adversarial agents form a vertex cut then some of the honest agents
might lose privacy of their entire costs to the adversary. For instance, if all
the neighbors of an honest agent are adversarial then privacy of that honest
agent’s cost can not be protected by the proposed privacy protocol.
4. The proposed privacy protocol can not preserve external privacy of the agents
(privacy of agents’ costs against eavesdroppers). Alternately, it relies on ex-
isting cryptographic encryptions for external privacy.
5. The communication links between the agents in the first phase are assumed
undirected. However, the agents are not required to communicate simultane-
ously and given the advancements in communication technology, full-duplex
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communication has become commonplace.
6. The adversarial agents are assumed passive. In practice, there can exist agents
in the network that are actively adversarial, i.e. they can disrupt the prescribed
distributed collaboration protocol including the privacy mechanism. In that
case, the proposed privacy protocol might not be effective.
3.4.2 Future Research
In order to overcome the aforementioned limitations, future research can be
pursued in the following directions.
1. Investigate if the sufficient condition for internal privacy of all the honest
agents is also necessary.
2. Explore the conditions under which the proposed two-phase approach can also
preserve external privacy, without relying on cryptographic encryptions.
3. Extend the applicability of the proposed privacy protocol for internal privacy
of the entire agents’ costs instead of just their affine parts.
4. Investigate the efficacy of the proposed privacy protocol in case where some
of the agents in the network are actively adversarial.
74
CHAPTER 4: MODEL-BASED SCHEME FOR EXTER-
NAL PRIVACY IN DISTRIBUTED COL-
LABORATION ALGORITHMS
This chapter investigates a model-based scheme for external privacy of agents
in distributed collaboration algorithms that can be modeled as ’one-channel feed-
back’ linear time-invariant (LTI) networked control systems (NCS), such as the co-
operative control of autonomous vehicles [11,50], output synchronization of passive
systems [51], supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) for smart homes or
power grids [52,53] and higher-order consensus [54,55]. A one-channel feedback1 LTI
NCS constitutes of a dynamic plant whose states evolve in a linear time-invariant
manner, and are measured by sensors that are remotely located. Whereas, the
controller is co-located with the actuators the drive the states of the plant [67].
For an example of such a distributed collaboration algorithm, consider a MAS
of n LTI control systems (or agents) wherein the collaboration objective is to achieve
consensus on states of all these control systems. Note that the agents in this case
are LTI control systems. Each control system i is associated with state xi, t ∈ Rn
1If both sensors and controller are remotely located from the actuators, then the NCS is referred















Figure 4.1: An illustration of the modeling of a distributed state-consensus algorithm by a
one-channel feedback networked control system.
and control input ui, t ∈ Rm for every time t ∈ Z≥0, where n, m are positive integers.
In this particular case, the input Ini, internal states Statei and output Outi of each
agent i is given by the agent’s initial state xi,0, collection of states {xi,t}t∈N and
asymptotic state limt→∞ xi,t, respectively.
The states evolve in time as following,
xi,t+1 = Aixi,t +Biui,t, ∀t ∈ Z≥0, ∀i ∈ [n]
where, Ai ∈ Rn×n and Bi ∈ Rn×m for all i ∈ [n]. To achieve the objective of
state consensus, that is to ensure limt→∞(xi,t − xj,t) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ [n], each agent i
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(xi,t − xj,t), ∀t ∈ Z≥0
where, Ki ∈ K ∈ Rm×n for all i ∈ [n]. Hence, the resultant mathematical model
of this distributed collaboration algorithm is equivalent to the following LTI control
system,
xt+1 = Axt +B ut, ut = K xt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.1)
where xt = [x
T
1,t, . . . , x
T
n,t]
T ∈ Rnn is the collection of all the states of the agents and
ut = [u
T
1,t, . . . , u
T
n,t]
T ∈ Rnm is the collection of all the control inputs of the agents.
The system parameters A ∈ Rnn×nn, B ∈ Rnn×nm and K ∈ Rnm×nn are as following:
A =





0n · · · An
 , B =





0n×m · · · Bn

and K = [Kij]i, j∈[n], where
Kij =

|Ni|Ki , i = j
−Ki , {i, j} ∈ E
0n×m , o.w.
Therefore, this particular distributed collaboration algorithm can be modeled
as a networked control system that constitutes of a linear time-invariant plant, and
whose states are measured by remote sensors (as shown in Fig. 4.1). Here, the sensor
measurements represent the states {Statei} that are exchanged between agents in
the intermediate stage of the distributed collaboration algorithm.
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Note: The external privacy of agents in such distributed collaboration algo-
rithms is equivalent to the privacy of sensor measurements against an eavesdropper




Figure 4.2: Schematic of a networked control system with remote sensors for measuring states.
Henceforth, the discussion in this chapter pertains to the privacy of the sen-
sor measurements (against eavesdroppers) of the ’one-channel feedback’ NCS (shown
in Fig. 4.2) whose states follow the dynamics given by (4.1). For notational conve-
nience, the dimension of xt and ut are simply represented by n and m, respectively
(i.e. nn and n m are replaced by n and m, respectively).
4.1 Formal Problem Description
Consider a distributed collaboration algorithm that can be modeled by an LTI
NCS with remote sensors (as shown in Fig. 4.2), whose states evolve according to the
dynamics (4.1). The sensor measurements denote the states that the agents generate
and exchange in the intermediate stage of the collaboration algorithm. Therefore,
privacy of the agents’ states (and inputs) against a passive adversary listening to the
messages exchanged between the agents in the distributed collaboration algorithm
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is equivalent to the privacy of sensor measurements against an eavesdropper that
is listening to the messages transmitted by the sensors (across the network) in the
resultant NCS shown in Fig.4.2.
4.1.1 Adversarial Model
An eavesdropper is defined as following.
Definition 4.1.1. (Eavesdropper) An eavesdropper is a passive adversary that can
read all the messages being transmitted by the sensors over the network in the NCS
shown in Fig.4.2. An eavesdropper has precise knowledge of the system parameters
(A, B and K) and the encryption scheme, if used, to encrypt the messages by the
sensors.
As an eavesdropper is assume passive, implies it can not tamper with the
messages in any form.
The view of an eavesdropper is the information stored in the messages trans-
mitted by the sensors over the network to the control. As defined formally in the
subsequent subsection, privacy of sensor measurements against an eavesdropper re-
quires that the view of the eavesdropper reveals little information (in statistical
sense) about the elements of xt at any time t ∈ Z≥0.
4.1.2 Assumptions
The assumptions made in this chapter are as following.
79
(A1) The distributed collaboration algorithm can be modeled as a ’one-channel
feedback’ NCS with LTI closed-loop dynamics.
(A2) There is no delay in the network.
(A3) The eavesdropper is a passive adversary, i.e. it does not tamper with the
messages.
(A4) In the state-dynamics (4.1), A+BK is non-singular.
4.2 Model-Based Privacy Scheme
This section is divided into two subsections. In the first subsection, the model-
based privacy scheme, which is referred as Masking With System Kernel (MSK), is
presented. In the second subsection, the privacy of states {xt} against an eaves-
dropper is formally defined along with its implications.







Figure 4.3: Schematic of the proposed model-based scheme, referred as masking with system
kernel (MSK).
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The proposed model-based scheme is referred as masking with system kernel
(MSK) to specify the mechanism that is used for preserving the privacy of the sensor
measurements, against an eavesdropper, in the aforementioned NCS. In masking
with system kernel (MSK), the sensor measurements {xt}t≥0 are masked before
transmission by adding a vector wt, that is randomly chosen from the kernel
2 of the
control gain K, to obtain the following masked sensor measurements (or masked
states) zt,
zt = xt + wt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.2)
Here, wt is distributed over a compact set Nt ⊂ N (K) at each t ∈ Z≥0. The
specifications on the probability density of wt and the compact set Nt are given in
the later part of the chapter.
Instead of the true state measurements xt the sensors transmit zt over the net-
work. The controller now computes the control input ut using the received masked
state measurements as following.
ut = Kzt = Kxt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0
Note As {ut}t∈Z≥0 remains unchanged, therefore masking of state measurements
as above does not affect the state dynamics of the NCS and so the internal states
{xt}t∈Z≥0 generated by the agents in the distributed collaboration algorithm is pre-
served.
Now, the view of an eavesdropper constitutes of the masked states {zt}t∈Z≥0 .
Therefore, privacy of sensor measurements against the eavesdropper requires that
2A vector v ∈ Rn belongs to the kernel of the matrix M ∈ Rn×n if and only if Mv = 0.
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the masked states {zt}t∈Z≥0 leak very little information about the elements of xt at
any time t ∈ Z≥0. Note that, by definition the probability distribution of wt is also
part of eavesdropper’s prior knowledge in addition to A, B and K.
4.2.2 Privacy Definition
The privacy of states is defined based on the (information-theoretic) notion of
perfect secrecy that was introduced by Shannon in his seminal work [9] and has be-
come an integral part of cryptography3 for analyzing privacy by encryption schemes.
The definition is the basis for deriving necessary and sufficient conditions under
which MSK guarantees privacy of states against an eavesdropper. The following
notation is introduced to formally define privacy of states.
Notation: Let Xt, Zt, Wt and Ut represent the random vectors corresponding
to xt, zt, wt and ut. The sequences of random vectors Zt and Ut are represented as
Zt = {z0, . . . , zt} and Ut = {U0, . . . , Ut}.
Owing to (4.1), the random vectors Xt, Zt, Wt and Ut are related as following.
Xt = (A+BK)
tX0, Zt = Xt +Wt and Ut = KZt (4.3)
for every t ∈ Z≥0.
As Ut = KZt,∀t ∈ Z≥0 and K is assumed public, thus
fXr|Zt,Ut(xr) = fXr|Zt(xr), ∀r, t ∈ Z≥0 (4.4)
3For further details on perfect secrecy, refer to Chapter 2 in [68]
82
In other words, the control inputs ut, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 provide no additional information on
xr (for any r ∈ Z≥0) than what is already available from the masked states zt, ∀t ∈
Z≥0. In fact, any transformation of zt that depends on the system parameters A,
B or K provides no additional information on xr (for any r ∈ Z≥0) than what is
already available from zt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 as A, B and K are assumed public (known to
the eavesdropper).
For a given time t ∈ Z≥0 and Zs = zs for all s ∈ {0, . . . , t}, Xs is contained
in the set Ms(zs) (as ws ∈ Ns, ∀s ∈ {0, . . . , t}), which is defined as
Ms(zs) = (xs ∈ Rn; zs − xs ∈ Ns)






Ks(zs) = (x0 ∈ Rn; zs − (A+BK)sx0 ∈ Ns), ∀s ∈ {0, . . . , t} (4.6)
for a given sequence of masked states zt = {z0, . . . , zt}.
This implies that
fX0|Zt (x0|zt) = 0, ∀x0 /∈ Kt, 0(zt) (4.7)
This equality holds regardless of the probability distribution of wt. Evidently,
from (4.7) it is quite obvious that MSK can not prevent disparity between the priori
(before observing the masked states) and posteriori (after observing the masked
states) probability distributions of Xs for any s ∈ {0, . . . , t}.
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It is clear from the above discussion that an eavesdropper can determine the
set of possible values of the initial state x0, i.e. Kt, 0(zt) by observing the masked
states from time 0 to t. Consequentially, it can also determine the sets of possible
values for states at subsequent times. However, if the design of MSK can ensure that
it is impossible to distinguish between any two state values of x0 in Kt, 0(zt), privacy
of states can be guaranteed. Alternately, privacy of x0 can be guaranteed if the
knowledge of masked states does not affect the posteriori probability distribution of
X0 in the set Kt, 0(zt). This intuition is used to formulate the following definition of
privacy of states.
Definition 4.2.1. MSK guarantees the privacy of states if both the following con-
ditions, C1 and C2, hold for every t ∈ Z≥0 and for any given sequence of masked
states zt = {z0, . . . , zt}.
C1 fXr|Zt (xr|zt) = fXr∈Kt, r(zt) (xr) for every r ∈ {0, . . . , t}.
C2 For every r ∈ {0, . . . , t}, there exists a vector vr ∈ Rn with all non-zero
elements (0 < |vr[i]|, ∀i) such that
[zr − vr, zr + vr] ⊆ Kt, r(zt)
Here, Kt, r(zt) = (x ∈ Rn; (A+BK)−rx ∈ Kt, 0(zt)).
The value δr = min
n
i=1 |vr[i]| is the degree of privacy for state at time r ∈ {0, . . . , t}.
Note: vt for any time t ∈ Z≥0 in the definition above should not independent
on the values of the masked states {z0, z1, . . .}.
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Condition C1 ensures that for any given sequence of masked states
Zt = zt = {z0, . . . , zt}, t ∈ Z≥0,
the posteriori probability distribution of Xr, r ∈ {0, . . . , t} should be the same as its
priori probability distribution in Kt, r(zt). Clearly, C1 is not as strong a condition as
the perfect secrecy4, which is impossible to achieve using MSK5. However, condition
C1 implies the following equality for every t ∈ Z≥0 and r ∈ {0, . . . , t},
fZt|Xr (zt|xr) = fZt|Xr (zt|x′r) (4.8)
where, xr and x
′
r are any two points in Kt, r(zt). The above implies that it is
impossible to distinguish between any two values of Xr, r ∈ {0, . . . , t} in Kt, r(zt)
given the masked states zt.
Now, for a given sequence of masked states zt the set of possible values of X0
is given by Kt, 0(zt) (refer (4.5)). It is not difficult to see that the set Kt, 0(zt) is
non-increasing with respect to t, that is
Kt+1, 0(zt+1) ⊆ Kt, 0(zt), ∀t ∈ Z≥0
Thus, it is very much possible that there exists a T ∈ N such that Kt, 0(zt) is
singleton6 for all t ≥ T . This is demonstrated by the following numerical example
4This is an obvious limitation as perfect secrecy is usually studied for the case of finite fields,
whereas here we are dealing with state vectors in n-dimensional space of real numbers
5In short, perfect secrecy would have required equivalence between the priori and posteriori
probability distributions, that is fX0|Zt (x0|zt) = fX0 (x0) , ∀x0 ∈ Rn. Hence, perfect secrecy is
impossible to achieve here as x0 ∈ Kt,0(zt) given the masked states zt.
6Kt, r(zt) is guaranteed to be non-empty from the very design of the MSK.
85
in which the set Kt, 0(zt) indeed reduces to singleton set for t greater than some
particular value. (Note that Kt, 0(zt) is singleton if and only if Kt, r(zt) is singleton
for all r ∈ {1, . . . , t}.)
Example to justify the need for condition C2 :







ut, ut = [ 1 1 ]xt




 , B =
 0
1
 and K = [ 1 1 ]





Let the states be masked using MSK as given by (4.2) with Wt ∈ U(Nt), where
Nt is a line segment of finite length along the vector vo for ∀t ∈ Z≥0.
Now, in this case wt is of the form λtvo, λt ∈ R for all t ∈ Z≥0. Consider the
mask vectors z0 and z1, given as following
z0 = x0 + w0, z1 = x1 + w1




, we get the following set
of equations
z0[1] = x0[1]− λ0, z0[2] = x0[2] + λ0










1 0 −1 0
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 −1









As the matrix in the RHS of (4.9) is non-singular, this implies that state vector x0
can be uniquely determined for the given masked states z0 and z1. In other words,
the set Kt, 0(zt) is singular for all t ≥ 1.
From Lemma 4.2.1, the masking of states in the form of MSK (4.2) with the
aforementioned specifications on the masks wt satisfies condition C1 of Definition
4.2.1. However, it has been shown that the states can be uniquely determined from
just observing the first 2 masked states. Therefore, not only this example explains
the reason for condition C2 in Definition 4.2.1, it also suggests that MSK can not
preserve privacy of states for any NCS.
Clearly, the privacy of state x0 is immediately lost if Kt, 0(zt) reduces to a
singleton set after some time. Therefore, we require an additional condition C2 to
ensure a lower bound on the size of Kt, r(zt), ∀r ∈ {0, . . . , t} for any sequence of
masked states Zt = zt, t ∈ Z≥0. Condition C2 implies that for every r ∈ {0, . . . , t}
there exists a vector vr with all non-zero elements such that the set [zr− vr, zr + vr]
is contained in Kt, r(zt).
The reason vr should have all non-zero elements is to ensure privacy of each
and every element of the state at time r ∈ {0, . . . , t}.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of the evolution of sets Kt, 0(zt) with time t and the implication of
condition C2 given in the definition of privacy of states.
The implication of Definition 4.2.1 (and perhaps a more natural definition
of privacy of states in this case) can be summarized in the following remark7.
Remark 4.2.1. If MSK guarantees privacy of states, then for any t ∈ Z≥0 and any
given sequence of t masked states zt there exists a vector vr ∈ Rn (with all non-zero
elements), such that
fZt|Xr (zt|xr) = fZt|Xr (zt|x′r) ,∀r ∈ {0, . . . , t} (4.10)
for all xr, x
′
r in [zr − vr, zr + vr].
Thus, privacy of states as defined above guarantees that it is impossible to
7To verify this, refer to the supporting argument of (4.8)
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distinguish between two state values from the set [zt−vt, zt+vt] at any time t, even
after observing the entire sequence of masked states.
Note the following remark expositing the importance of vr,∀r ∈ {0, . . . , t}
having all non-zero elements and degree of privacy.
Remark 4.2.2. From (4.10), each element Xr[i], i ∈ {1, . . . , n} can take any value
in [zr[i]− vr[i], zr[i] + vr[i]] for a given sequence of masked states zt. Therefore, the
size of the range of possible values for i-th element of state at time r ∈ {0, . . . , t}
is equal to 2|vr[i]|. Hence, δr is the factor that determines lower bound8 on the size
of the set of possible values for each element of the state at r (as vr at any time
r ∈ Z≥0 is independent of the sequence of masked sates). Thus, degree of privacy δt
is a critical measure of the extent of privacy of state at any time t ∈ Z≥0.
The subsequent subsection presents the necessary and sufficient conditions
under which MSK guarantees privacy of states, in the formal sense as defined above.
4.2.3 Privacy Analysis
The following result follows from an existing result on state estimation of an
LTI system in the presence of independent and uniformly distributed measurement
noise (cf. Servi and Ho, 1981 [69]).
Lemma 4.2.1. (Modified version of the Theorem in [69]) If Wt ∼ U(Nt), ∀t ∈ Z≥0
where Nt is any compact subset of N (K) then MSK satisfies C1.
8It is a lower bound as it is concerned with only the possible values along a single vector vr at
any time r.
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Proof. Let the probability density of Wt be
fWt(wt) =

γt ∀wt ∈ Nt
0 otherwise
, ∀t ∈ Z≥0
where γt is some positive real-valued number for every t ∈ Z≥0. (The actual value
of γt is not consequential in the proof.)




γt ∀wt ∈ Nt
0 otherwise
, ∀t ∈ Z≥0
It should be noted that for deriving the conditional probability above, we have
implicitly used the fact that x0 = (A+BK)
−txt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0.
Consequentially, the conditional probability distribution of Zt at any time
t ∈ Z≥0 for a given X0 = x0 is as following (refer to (4.2))
fZt|X0(zt|x0) =

γt ∀x0 ∈ Kt(zt)
0 otherwise
As the random vectors wt, t = 0, 1, . . . are independent of each other, this





s=0 γs ∀x0 ∈ Kt, 0(zt)
0 otherwise
(4.11)






















fX0|Zt(x0|zt) = fX0∈Kt, 0(zt)(X0 = x0),
for every t ∈ Z≥0. As A + BK is assumed non-singular and X0 ∈ Kt, 0(zt) is
equivalent to Xr ∈ Kt, r(zt) for any r ∈ N, we get
fXr|Zt(xr|zt) = fXr∈Kt, r(zt)(Xr = xr), ∀r, t ∈ Z≥0
This concludes the proof. 
According to Lemma 4.2.1, if the mask vectors wt are independently and uni-
formly distributed in some compact subset Nt of N (K) for every t ∈ Z≥0 then C1
holds. However, mere random selections of wt, t ∈ Z≥0 does not guarantee C2, as
has been shown by the example in Section 4.2.2.
Using Lemma 4.2.1 and the fact that at any time t the states xt are masked/masked
by adding a random vector from N (K), we get the following necessary condition
for MSK to guarantee privacy of states.
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Theorem 4.2.1. For the considered NCS with state dynamics (4.1), MSK guar-
antees privacy of states only if ∃v ∈ N (K) with all non-zero elements such that
Atv ∈ N (K),∀t ∈ Z≥0.
Proof. If MSK guarantees privacy of states, then both C1 and C2 should hold.
From Lemma 4.2.1 we know that C1 holds if wt ∼ U(Nt), ∀t ∈ Z≥0, regardless of
A, B and K (as long as A+BK is non-singular).
If C2 holds then for every t ∈ Z≥0 there exists a vector vt ∈ N (K) (with all
non-zero elements) such that for a given value of zt, two distinct possible values of
state at t are
xt = zt − (1− 2λt)vt,
x′t = zt − (1− 2λ′t)vt
As the state evolution (given by (4.1)) is preserved under MSK, corresponding to
the above possible values of state at t, we have the following possibilities for state
at t+ 1
xt+1 = (A+BK)zt − (1− 2λt)Avt,
x′t+1 = (A+BK)zt − (1− 2λ′t)Avt
For a given value of zt+1, the values xt+1 and x
′
t+1 are possible for state at t+ 1 only
if xt+1 − x′t+1 ∈ N (K), i.e Avt ∈ N (K).
This implies, (A + BK)τvt = A
τvt, ∀τ ∈ Z≥0. Therefore, after τ steps, the
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following two distinct states
xt+τ = (A+BK)
τzt − (1− 2λt)Aτvt,
x′t+τ = (A+BK)
τzt − (1− 2λ′t)Aτvt
are possible only if Aτvt ∈ N (K), ∀τ ∈ Z≥0. 
It is worth noting that the aforementioned condition is necessary for having
multiple possibilities of xt with distinct elements (at all times), given the masked
states {z0, . . . , zt, . . .}. Therefore, Theorem 4.2.1 holds regardless of how the privacy
of states is defined.
It is interesting to note here that it is impossible to observe the states xt from
the control input ut under the necessary condition given above, as is formally shown
by the following Lemma:
Lemma 4.2.2. Unobservability of the pair (A+BK, K) is equivalent to existence
of a non-zero vector v ∈ N (K) s.t. Atv ∈ N (K), ∀t ∈ Z≥0.









has rank less than n. To verify the ‘if’ part, just assume a non-zero v in N (K)
(dimension of N (K) is at least one) such that Av ∈ N (K) then it is quite obvious
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that Ov = 0nm and so rank(O) < n. To verify the ‘only if’ part, let O be rank-









For this to happen, v should belong to N (K). Further, this v should also satisfy
K(A+BK)tv = KAtv = 0m, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} (as v ∈ N (K) is already inferred).
Therefore, if Atv /∈ N (K) for any t then O does not have a non-trivial kernel (using
the Cayley-Hamilton Theorem). 
It is well-known in control theory that one can observe xt of system (4.1) from
the control input ut if and only if (A+BK, K) is observable. Thus, from the above
result it is obvious that we can not observe xt from ut if the condition given in
Theorem 4.2.1 is satisfied.
It turns out, a slight variation of the above necessary condition is also sufficient
for MSK to guarantee privacy of states, as is formally demonstrated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2. For the considered NCS with state dynamics (4.1), if there exists
a vector v ∈ N (K) with all non-zero elements such that Av = µv, µ 6= 0 then MSK







1. W0 ∼ U(N0), N0 = [−dov, dov], do ∈ R>0,
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2. wt = µ
tw0, ∀t ∈ N
and do is any positive real-valued number.
Proof. Consider any t ∈ Z≥0 and sequence of masked states till time t, zt =
{z0, . . . , zt}.
As wt = µ
tw0, we get
zt = xt + wt = (A+BK)
tz0, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.12)
Consequentially,
Zt = (A+BK)
tZ0, ∀t ∈ Z≥0
The aforementioned relationship between the masked states in time implies that
fX0|Zt(x0|zt) = fX0|Z0(x0|z0), ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.13)





As w0 ∼ U ([−dov, dov]) and is independent of x0, this implies
fZ0|X0(z0|x0) =

γ0 ∀x0 ∈ K0(z0)
0 otherwise
(4.15)
where γ0 is some positive real number (the actual value is not required for the proof).







fX0(x)dx = γ0Pr (X0 ∈ K0(z0)) (4.16)




Pr(X0∈K0(z0)) ∀x0 ∈ K0(z0)
0 otherwise
or simply,
fX0|Z0(x0|z0) = fX0∈K0(z0)(x0) (4.17)
Now, we first show that K0(z0) and Kt, 0(zt) are indeed equivalent in this case.
As w0 ∈ N0 and N0 = [−dov, dov], this implies that for any x0 ∈ K0(z0) we can
write
z0 − x0 = −λdov + (1− λ)dov (4.18)
where, λ is some value in [0, 1]. As v ∈ N (K) is the right eigenvector of A with
Av = µv, we get
(A+BK)tv = µtv, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.19)
From (4.18) and (4.19), we get
(A+BK)tz0 − (A+BK)tx0 = −λµtv + (1− λ)µtv (4.20)
for every t ∈ Z≥0. From (4.12) and the fact that wt = µtw0, (4.20) is equivalent to
the following
zt − (A+BK)tx0 = wt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.21)
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Therefore, from (4.21) it is quite evident that if x0 ∈ K0(z0) then x0 ∈ Kt(zt), ∀t ∈
Z≥0. Inferentially, K0(z0) ⊆ Kt, 0(zt). However, Kt, 0(zt) ⊆ K0(z0) as Kt, 0(zt) =⋂t
s=0Ks(zs). This implies that
Kt, 0(zt) = K0(z0), ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.22)
Equation (4.22) has the following twofold implications.
(i) Combining (4.22) with (4.13) and (4.17) gives
fX0|Zt(x0|zt) = fX0∈Kt, 0(zt)(x0)
As A+BK is non-singular, the equality above implies that9
fXr|Zt(xr|zt) = fXr∈Kt, r(zt)(xr)
for every r ∈ {0, . . . , t}. Here, Kt, r(zt) = (x ∈ Rn; (A+BK)−rx ∈ Kt, 0(zt)).
Hence, condition C1 of Definition 4.2.1 is satisfied.
(ii) From (4.22), we get Kt, 0(zt) = [z0− d0v, z0 + d0v]. Now, using (4.12) and
(4.19) here implies that
Kt, r(zt) = [zr − µrd0v, zr + µrd0v], ∀r ∈ {0, . . . , t} (4.23)
Hence, condition C2 of Definition 4.2.1 is satisfied with vr = µ
rv, ∀r ∈ Z≥0.








Note that the conclusions above holds for any t ∈ Z≥0 and any sequence of
masked states zt generated by the MSK (in (4.2)) with the given specifications.
Clearly, from (4.23) the degree of privacy of the state at time t ∈ Z≥0 is given




As a corollary of Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we have
Corollary 4.2.1. If the dimension of N (K) is one, then MSK guarantees privacy
of states (for the considered NCS) if and only if there exists a vector v in N (K)
with all non-zero elements and Av = µv, µ 6= 0.
In case the dimension of N (K) is equal to m > 1, then it is not necessary
for a single vector v with all non-zero elements to be the right-eigenvector of A.
Instead, we can have m ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} independent vectors vj ∈ N (K) that
satisfy Avj = µjvj, µj 6= 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and each vector vj, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}
can have some elements equal to zero. In this scenario, MSK can guarantee privacy
of states if the sum (or weighted sum) of these vectors,
∑m
j=1 vj, has all non-zero
elements. This result is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.3. For the considered NCS with state dynamics (4.1), if there ex-
ists m > 0 independent vectors vj ∈ N (K) such that Avj = µjvj, µj 6= 0, ∀j ∈





has all non-zero elements then MSK guarantees privacy of states with degree of








j=1 ωj, where each ωj is uniformly and independently chosen from





jωj, ∀t ∈ N
and do is any positive real-valued number and m ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Proof. (The proof uses the results deduced in the proof of Theorem 4.2.2.)
Consider any t ∈ Z≥0 and let zt = {z0, . . . , zt} be a given sequence of t + 1
masked states generated by the MSK (refer to (4.2)) with the given specifications
for wt.
As Avj = µjvj and vj ∈ N (K) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, this implies
(A+BK)tvj = µ
t
jvj, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m}
for every t ∈ Z≥0. Therefore wt = (A+BK)tw0, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 and so,
Zt = Xt +Wt = (A+BK)
tZ0, ∀t ∈ Z≥0
Consequentially,
fX0|Zt(x0|zt) = fX0|Z0(x0|z0), ∀t ∈ Z≥0
Using the arguments given in the proof of Theorem 4.2.2 it is easy to infer that
fX0|Z0(x0|z0) = fX0∈K0(z0)(x0) (4.25)







−λjµtjdjvj + (1− λj)µtjdjvj
}




For any x0 ∈ K0(z0) (from (4.26)),
z0 − x0 = w0 =
m∑
j=1
{λj(−djvj) + (1− λj)(djvj)}












µtj {λj(−djvj) + (1− λj)(djvj)} = wt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0
This is equivalent to
zt − (A+BK)tx0 = wt ∈ Nt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0
Therefore, if x0 ∈ K0(z0) then x0 ∈ Kt(zt), ∀t ∈ Z≥0.




Kt, 0(zt) = K0(z0), ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.27)
Equations (4.25) and (4.27) implies
fX0|Z0(x0|z0) = fX0∈Kt, 0(zt)(x0)
This equality combined with the fact that A + BK is non-singular implies the
following for every r ∈ {0, . . . , t}
fXr|Zr(xr|zr) = fXr∈Kt, r(zt)(xr)
Hence, condition C1 of Definition 4.2.1 is satisfied.
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Now, note that the line segment [−dov0, dov0] ⊂ N0, where v0 is the same as defined
in (4.24).
Therefore, [z0 − dov0, z0 + dov0] ⊂ K0(z0) = Kt, 0(zt). Consequentially, as
zt = (A+BK)
tz0, this implies that
[zr − dovr, zr + dovr] ⊂ Kt, r(zt), ∀r ∈ {1, . . . , t} (4.28)





jvj. Hence, condition C2 of Definition 4.2.1 is
also satisfied.
Note that the conclusions above holds for any t ∈ Z≥0 and corresponding
sequence of masked states till t generated by the MSK (as given by (4.2)) with the
given specifications.
Clearly, from (4.28) the degree of privacy for the state at any time t is given






jvj[i]|,∀t ∈ Z≥0. 
The above necessary and sufficient conditions clearly indicate that MSK in
the current form can guarantee privacy of states only for a subset of one-channel
feedback NCS. Moreover, it is not difficult to see (from the necessary condition
in 4.2.1) that if MSK were to guarantee the privacy of states then we can not have
desirable pole-placement for the close-loop transfer function.
It is however possible to ensure asymptotic stability of the NCS by appropri-
ately choosing K that simultaneously satisfies the above necessary and sufficient
conditions, and Schur stability criterion of the transition matrix A + BK. A sim-
ple numerical example in the next section demonstrates this. However, in general




This section presents an example to illustrate the proposed model-based scheme.
First, a simple numerical example (Example I) demonstrates the result in Theorem
4.2.2. Then, a system of two quadrotors (or agents) is considered in Example II,
wherein the collaboration objective of the quadrotors is to reach consensus on their
elevations while keeping their individual initial elevations private from an eavesdrop-
per listening to the messages being exchanged between the rotors.
4.3.1 Example I
Consider the following state-dynamics of the plant in the considered NCS
xt+1 = Axt +But, ut = Kxt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.29)
where xt ∈ R2, ∀t ∈ Z≥0,
A =
 1 ε
0 −εkd + 1
 , B =
 0
ε
 and K = −[k1, k2].
Here kd, k1, k2 and ε are positive real values such that
k1 = kdk2 and ε /∈ 1/kd.
Here,





Clearly, both the elements of v are non-zero (this is one of the required conditions
in Theorem 4.2.2). From simple calculations, we get
Av =
 −k2 + εk1
−εk1kd + k1

As k1 = kdk2, we get
Av =
 −k2 + εk1
−εk1kd + k1
 = (1− εkd)v (4.31)
where, (1− εkd) 6= 0. Also, note that
A+BK =
 1 ε
−εkdk2 1− ε(k2 + kd)

is non-singular with eigenvalues 1− εkd and 1− εk2.
Therefore, the system parameters in this case satisfy the conditions prescribed
in Theorem 4.2.2 with v as given in (4.30) and µ = (1− εkd). Hence, MSK as given
by (4.2) or specifically the masking of xt as following
zt = xt + wt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0
where w0 is chosen uniformly from the set [−dov, dov] and wt = (1−εkd)tw0, ∀t ∈ N
guarantees privacy of state xt at any time t ∈ Z≥0 against an eavesdropper with
unbounded computation power with degree of privacy do(1− εkd)t min{k2, kdk2} for
any t ∈ Z≥0. Here, do can any positive real number. Consequentially, the control







Figure 4.5: An example for illustrating the proposed model-based scheme.
4.3.2 Example II
Consider two quadrotors (hereafter referred to as agents) as shown in Fig. 4.5,
collaborating to reach consensus on their elevation. The discrete-time dynamics of
the elevation of each agent i ∈ {1, 2} is given as following for all t ∈ Z≥0 (ref. [11]),
hi,t+1 = hi,t + εkdḣi,t
ḣi,t+1 = (1− εkd)ḣi,t + ui,t
where, hi,t and ḣi,t are the elevation and rate of change in elevation, respectively of
agent i. Here, kd and ε are positive real-valued constants.
In this example, it is demonstrated that the agents can mask their states
({(hi,t, ḣi,t)}t∈Z≥0) using MSK to protect privacy of their initial elevations (h1,0, h2,0)
from an eavesdropper and at the same time fulfill their objective of reaching a
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common elevation.
Let xi,t = [hi,t, ḣi,t]
T . Then, we get
xi,t+1 = Axi,t +Bui,t, ∀t ∈ Z≥0, i ∈ {1, 2} (4.32)
where, xi,t ∈ R2 and ui,t ∈ R represent the states and the control inputs (commands
of the collaboration algorithms) of the agents i = {1, 2} at time t. Note that the
system parameters A and B are same as in (4.29). However, range of ε is different,
















To reach consensus on their elevations, the agents use the following control
inputs,
ui,t = K(x1,t − x2,t), u2,t = K(x2,t − x1,t), ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.34)
where K = −[k1, k2] is the same as in (4.29) with k1 ∈ R>0 and k2 ∈ R>0 and
k1 = kdk2.














for every t ∈ Z≥0. We get the following result:
Lemma 4.3.1. If the agents apply the control inputs given in (4.34) with ε ∈
(0, min{1/kd, 1/2k2), then the states x1,t and x2,t exponentially converge to each
other.
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Proof. Let et = x1,t − x2,t be the error between the states of the plants at each
time t ∈ Z≥0.
From the state dynamics given in (4.33), we get
et+1 = Aet +B(u1,t − u2,t), ∀t ∈ Z≥0
Substituting the control inputs given in (4.34) above yields the following error dy-
namics
et+1 = (A+ 2BK)et, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.36)
Axiomatically, the state-synchronization is equivalent to the origin being asymp-
totically stable for (4.36). From the well-known result in discrete-time linear systems
we know that the origin of (4.36) is asymptotically stable if and only if A+ 2BK is
a Schur matrix [71]. From simple calculations, we have
A+ 2BK =
 1 ε
−2εk2kd 1− ε(kd + 2k2)

with eigenvalues equal to 1− εkd and 1− 2εk2.
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for state-synchronization of
(4.33) with the control inputs (4.34) requires:
0 < 1− εkd < 1 and 0 < 1− 2εk2 < 1 (4.37)
For the sake of convenience let αt = h1,t + h2,t and βt = ḣ1,t + ḣ2,t. From (4.33), we
get
αt+1 = αt + εβt
βt+1 = (1− εkd)βt
(4.38)
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for every t ∈ Z≥0. From (4.38), for every t ∈ N we get
αt = α0 + εβ0
t−1∑
s=0
(1− εkd)s and βt = (1− εkd)tβ0 (4.39)








 α0 + 1kdβ0
0
 (4.40)
Hence, the elevation of both agents converge to the same value, which is given by
(4.40). 
In order to compute the control inputs (4.34), the agents need to exchange val-
ues of {(hi,t, ḣi,t)}t∈Z≥0 on the communication link, revealing their initial elevations
to any eavesdropper listening to the communication link. Thus, in the following we
present how each agent i can mask {(hi,t, ḣi,t)}t∈Z≥0 as {(h̃i,t,
˜̇hi,t)}t∈Z≥0 using MSK





 , B =
 −B 02
02 −B




Using the above notation, (4.35) can be written as
xt+1 = Axt + But, ut = Kxt, ∀t ∈ Z≥0 (4.41)
Note that A + BK is non-singular.
The agents mask their states as following before transmitting them over the
communication link.
zi,t = xi,t + wi,t, ∀t ∈ Z≥0, i = {1, 2} (4.42)
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with
wi,0 ∼ U ([−dov, dov]) and wi,t = (1− εkd)twi,0, ∀t ∈ N.
and v is same as given in (4.30). Equivalently, h̃i,t and
˜̇hi,t are given by the first and
the second element zi,t, respectively for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
Thus, the new control inputs for each each agents are now given by ut = Kzt.
Equivalently, we get













. Note that the masking





 , v2 =
 02
v




Clearly, as v has all non-zero elements, this implies that v0 also has all non-zero
elements. It is easy to verify that both v1 and v2 belong to N (K) with Av1 =
(1 − εkd)v1 and Av2 = (1− εkd)v2 where 0 < (1 − εkd) < 1. Therefore, the system
parameters satisfy the relationship given in Theorem 4.2.3.
Now, it is easy to verify that masking of xt in (4.43) satisfies the specifications
of MSK given in Theorem 4.2.3.
Therefore, from Theorem 4.2.3, for any given t ∈ Z≥0 and a corresponding
sequence of masked states (as generated by (4.43)) zt,
fZt|Xr (zt|x0) = fZt|Xr (zt|x0) (4.45)
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for all x0, x
′
0 in the set [z0−dov0, z0 +dov0]. Here, X0 = [(X1,0)T , (X2,0)T ] represents
the random vector for x0.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
The proposed model-based scheme can preserve external privacy of agents’ in-
puts in a distributed collaboration algorithms that can be modeled as a one-channel
feedback linear time-invariant networked control system whose system parameters
satisfy certain conditions. The model-based scheme, referred to as masking with
system kernel (MSK), exploits the inherent property of unobservability in certain
distributed collaboration algorithms, that involve dynamical systems, to preserve the
external privacy of agents’ inputs to overcome the shortcomings of cryptographic
encryptions.
4.4.1 Limitations
The limitations of the model-based privacy scheme or MSK are as following.
1. The model-based based scheme is only effective for those distributed collab-
oration algorithms that can be modeled as linear time-invariant networked
control systems whose system parameters satisfy a specific condition (given
in Theorem 4.2.1). This is a strong limitation of the scheme as in general
distributed collaboration algorithms need not be linear or even time-invariant.
2. Often in practical scenarios, the communication links in the network suffer
from delays, leading to asynchronicity between agents. In this chapter, delays
109
in communication links are not considered and therefore agents are assumed
to operate in a synchronous manner.
4.4.2 Future Research
In order to overcome the aforementioned limitations, future research can be
pursued in the following directions.
1. Investigate a methodology for altering the collaboration algorithm (without
affecting the collaboration objective) to satisfy the conditions that are required
for guaranteeing external privacy by the proposed model-based scheme.
2. Investigate the extension of external privacy guarantee to the case where sys-
tems parameters of the resultant NCS do not satisfy the prescribed sufficient
conditions.
3. Study the effect of delays in the communication links for the proposed model-
based scheme.
4. Investigate the efficacy of the model-based scheme for distributed collaboration
algorithms that have non-linear and time-varying dynamics.
5. Investigate the possibility of using this model-based privacy scheme for ex-
changing information across network in a secure manner, i.e. explore the
possibility of using the model-based scheme for encryption purposes.
6. Formulate a more general privacy definition, where the obscurity in the agents’
states in view of the eavesdropper is multi-dimensional.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY
This dissertation addressed the issue of privacy in distributed collaboration
algorithms by classifying privacy into two types, internal and external privacy, de-
pending on the means through which an adversary (passive) learns information
about agents’ inputs.
1. Internal Privacy : refers to the privacy of agents’ inputs against a passive
adversary that corrupts some of the agents that are participating in the dis-
tributed collaboration.
2. External Privacy : refers to the privacy of agents’ inputs against a passive
adversary reading messages that are exchanged between agents in the inter-
mediate stage of the distributed collaboration.
This dissertation proposed a privacy protocol that can be used for preserving
internal privacy of agents in two particular distributed collaboration algorithms;
distributed average consensus and distributed optimization. Further, this dissertation
investigated a model-based scheme for external privacy in distributed collaboration
algorithms that can be modeled as linear time-invariant networked control systems,
as an alternative to cryptographic encryptions.
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The contribution, limitations and future directions of the proposed solutions
are summarized as following.
5.1 Contribution: Internal Privacy in Distributed Collabo-
ration
The proposed privacy protocol can be interpreted as a general approach for
constructing distributed average consensus and distributed optimization algorithms
that ensures internal privacy—in a formal sense as described in Chapters 2-3—if
the passively adversarial agents (i.e. agents corrupted by a passive adversary) do
not constitute a vertex cut of the underlying communication network of the MAS.
The approach constitutes of two phases (as illustrated in Fig. 5.1):
1. In the first phase, the agents run a privacy mechanism to compute new “effec-
tive inputs”. The effective inputs are computed based on the original inputs
and the correlated random values that are shared between adjacent agents in
the privacy mechanism.
2. In the second phase, the agents run an arbitrary distributed collaboration
algorithm (Π) on their effective inputs, instead of their original inputs.
The above two-step process has been discussed in detail for the case of dis-
tributed average consensus and distributed optimization in Chapters 2 and 3, re-
spectively. The effective inputs, denoted by {Ĩni}, that are computed in the first
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Figure 5.1: In the proposed protocol for internal privacy in distributed collaborations, the agents
run a privacy mechanism on their inputs {Ini} before execute the distributed collaboration algo-
rithm, to compute effective inputs {Ĩni} that satisfy Collabi({Ink}) = Collabi({Ĩnk}).
puts are preserved. The internal privacy in this approach relies on the randomness
introduced by the privacy mechanism and the privacy guarantee holds regardless
of the distributed collaboration protocol used in the second phase. This is proved
by showing that internal privacy holds even if all the effective inputs of the honest
agents are revealed to the adversarial agents (worst-case scenario).
5.1.1 Limitations
Limitations of the proposed two phase approach for internal privacy in dis-
tributed collaboration (average consensus and optimization) are as following.
1. For now, the privacy protocol has been investigated for internal privacy in
only two particular distributed collaborations; distributed average consensus
and distributed optimization.
2. In case of distributed average consensus, the agents are required to know the
value of n, that is the size of the network.
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3. In case of distributed optimization, for now, internal privacy can only be
guaranteed for the affine parts of the agents’ costs. However, the proposed
privacy protocol can be extended easily for internal privacy of higher-order
parts (or coefficients) of the agents’ costs.
4. This protocol does not prevent loss of information on honest agents’ inputs due
to their contribution in the adversarial agents’ collaboration outputs. Conse-
quentially, the adversary readily knows the aggregate of the honest agents’
inputs in both distributed average consensus and distributed optimization.
5. If the adversarial agents form a vertex cut in the communication network, then
some of the honest agents might lose privacy of their inputs to the adversary.
For instance, if all the neighbors of an honest agent are adversarial then inter-
nal privacy of that agent’s input is not be protected by the proposed privacy
protocol.
6. The proposed privacy protocol can not preserve external privacy of the agents
(i.e. privacy of agents’ inputs against eavesdroppers). Alternately, it relies on
the existing cryptographic encryptions for external privacy.
7. The communication links between the agents in the privacy mechanism (first
phase) are assumed undirected. However, the agents are not required to com-
municate simultaneously and given the advancements in communication tech-
nology, full-duplex communication links are commonplace.
8. The adversarial agents (or the adversary) are assumed passive. In practice,
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there can exist agents in the network that are actively adversarial, i.e. they can
disrupt the prescribed distributed collaboration protocol including the privacy
mechanism. Under this scenario, the proposed privacy protocol might not be
effective.
5.1.2 Future Research
In order to overcome the aforementioned limitations, future research can be
pursued in the following directions.
1. Explore the conditions under which the proposed two-phase approach can also
preserve external privacy, without relying on cryptographic encryptions.
2. Explore the applicability of the proposed privacy protocol if some of the agents
in the network are actively malicious.
3. Investigate if the proposed protocol can preserve internal privacy of the inter-
nal states generated in the intermediate stage of a distributed collaboration
algorithm. This can enhance the applicability of the proposed protocol to
more general distributed collaborations.
4. Investigate if the sufficient condition for guaranteeing internal privacy of all the
honest agents is also necessary. Otherwise, investigate the least conservative
sufficient condition.
5. Investigate conditions under which the proposed protocol can also preserve
external privacy, without relying on cryptographic encryptions.
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6. Investigate the efficacy of the proposed protocol if some of the agents in the
network are actively malicious.
7. In case of distributed average consensus, design a similar two-phase approach
for internal privacy in distributed computation of more general functions than
just the average. In case of distributed optimization, extend the proposed
protocol for internal privacy of the entire agents’ costs instead of just their
affine parts.
5.2 Contribution: External Privacy in Distributed Collab-
oration
This dissertation investigates model-based scheme, also referred as masking
with system kernel or MSK, for external privacy in distributed collaboration al-
gorithms that can be modeled as linear time-invariant networked control systems.
In contrast to the cryptographic encryptions, privacy of the proposed model-based
scheme does not rely on secure generation and distribution of keys amongst the
agents. Instead, the model-based scheme exploits the inherent redundancies in cer-
tain distributed collaboration algorithms. The model-based scheme introduces min-
imal overhead delays and thus, it does not threaten the stability of the collaboration
algorithm, which is especially critical if the agents participating in the collaboration
are physical dynamic systems.
The external privacy is guaranteed by the model-based scheme, if certain
conditions are met by the distributed collaboration algorithm, in an information-
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theoretic manner using a relaxed notion of Shannon’s perfect secrecy. It is interesting
to note that the required conditions are closely related to the well-known concept
of unobservability in control systems theory. The details of the results are given in
Chapter 4.
5.2.1 Limitations
The limitations of the model-based privacy scheme or MSK are as following.
1. The model-based based scheme is only effective for those distributed collabora-
tion algorithms that can be modeled as linear time-invariant networked control
systems, whose system parameters satisfy certain conditions (as specified in
Chapter 4). This is a strong limitation of the scheme as in general distributed
collaboration algorithms need not be linear or even time-invariant. However,
the restrictions on the system parameters can be met by appropriately design-
ing the collaboration algorithm as demonstrated by the numerical examples,
Example I and Example II, in Chapter 4
2. Often in practical scenarios, the communication links in the network suffer
from package drops and delays, leading to asynchronicity between the agents.
In this dissertation, delays in communication links have not been considered
and therefore agents are assumed to operate in a synchronous manner.
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5.2.2 Future Research
In order to overcome the aforementioned limitations, future research can be
pursued in the following directions.
1. For now, the formulated privacy definition gives a minimal requirement for
guaranteeing privacy of agents’ inputs. A more general privacy definition can
be formulated, wherein the possible values of agents inputs might belong to
multi-dimensional set (instead of a one-dimensional set as in the current form)
in view of the eavesdropper.
2. Investigate a methodology for altering a collaboration algorithm (without af-
fecting the collaboration objective) to satisfy the conditions that are required
for guaranteeing external privacy by the proposed model-based scheme.
3. Extend (or investigate) the external privacy guarantee for the case when sys-
tems parameters of the resultant NCS do not satisfy the conditions prescribed
in Chapter 4.
4. Study the effect of delays in the communication links on the proposed model-
based scheme.
5. Investigate the efficacy of the model-based scheme for distributed collaboration
algorithms that have non-linear and time-varying dynamics.
6. Investigate the possibility of using this model-based privacy scheme for ex-
changing information across network in a secure manner.
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